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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Following an argument-turned-fight with his wife, Preston Joy was charged with second 
degree kidnapping, felony domestic battery, and sexual penetration by a foreign object. Mr. Joy 
exercised his right to a jury trial. 
Prior to, and during, Mr. Joy's trial (wherein Mr. and Mrs. Joy each portrayed the other 
as the aggressor), the district court made a host of rulings (ten) that Mr. Joy contends were 
erroneous. Chief among them was the district court's pretrial order allowing the State to offer 
extensive "prior bad act" evidence pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b ). 
At the conclusion of his trial, Mr. Joy was found guilty of felony domestic battery; he 
was acquitted of sexual penetration by a foreign object; and the jury hung on the kidnapping 
charge. Following the trial, Mr. Joy entered a conditional guilty plea on the kidnapping charge, 
specifically preserving his right to appeal any and all of the district court's rulings. 
On appeal, Mr. Joy asserts that the district court erred in: (1) admitting the "prior bad act" 
evidence; (2) precluding him from obtaining discovery of certain relevant, exculpatory evidence; 
(3) committing seven distinct evidentiary errors mid-trial; and (4) failing to instruct the jury on 
certain lesser-included offenses. He asserts that these errors are prejudicial in their own right, but 
even to the extent that they are not, there was such an aggregation of errors in his case that he 
was denied a fair trial under the cumulative error doctrine. He asks that his case be remanded for 
a new trial on the domestic battery and kidnapping charges. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Preston Joy and his wife, Jennifer, have been together for approximately sixteen years, 
and have been married for approximately eight of those years. (Tr., p.502, L.23 - p.503, L.5.) 
Although there is no evidence of any domestic violence during the vast majority of that period, 
Mrs. Joy claims that her husband turned violent in approximately April 2009. (See PSI, p.2.) 
I 
Mrs. Joy has identified five alleged incidents between late March and late July 2009 
where she claims that her husband victimized her. 1 According to Mrs. Joy, on the night of July 
28-29, 2009, during the last of these five alleged incidents, Mr. Joy shoved her into the tub in 
their bedroom, stripped her naked, 2 repeatedly held her head under water. punched and slapped 
her, tied her up with a leather boot lace,3 penetrated her anus with a large purple dildo for a 
time,4 dragged her in a hogtied position out to his pickup truck,5 punched her and slapped her 
some more, and drove her to a wooded section of the Joys' property where he threatened to tie 
her to a tree and leave her to die, all before taking her back home and going to bed. (Tr., p.278, 
1 The first four of these alleged incidents, although not the bases for the charges in this case, 
were nonetheless testified to by Mrs. Joy in the trial of this matter. (See Tr., p.260, L.22 - p.278, 
L.4 (providing Mrs. Joy's version of the first four of these incidents and claiming that Mr. Joy 
anally raped her sometime prior to April 10, 2009, and that he was physically abusive during 
arguments the couple had on April 10, 2009, July4, 2009, and July 19, 2009).) 
2 Mrs. Joy has given inconsistent statements on this point. She initially told the police that she 
could not remember for sure, but she thought Mr. Joy removed her clothes before she got in the 
tub (Tr., p.440, L.25 - p.441, L.5); however, approximately seven months later, at her husband's 
trial, she claimed to have a clear memory (see Tr., p.285, Ls.11-23), and that she was shoved in 
the tub fully clothed (see Tr., p.394, Ls.11-21 ). 
3 Mrs. Joy has given inconsistent statements on this point. She initially told the police that after 
her husband tied her up, she managed to get one hand free (Tr., p.441, Ls.6-1 O); however, by the 
time of the preliminary hearing and trial in this case, her story had changed to where she did not 
think she was able to wriggle her hand free. (See Prelim. Tr., p.40, Ls.6-24; Tr., p.286, L.23 
p.287, L.6, p.3 99, L.18 p.400, L.17, p.402, Ls.11-17 .) 
4 Mrs. Joy has given inconsistent statements on this point. She initially told the police that the 
dildo was used in her vagina. (Tr., p.400, L.21 -p.401, L.2, p.442, Ls.16-20.) She also told the 
police that she did not consider this act to have been rape. (Tr., p.442, Ls.16-22.) It was not until 
a few days later that she claimed the dildo had been used in her anus. (Tr., p.401, Ls.11-17.) 
5 Mrs. Joy has given inconsistent statements on this point. She initially told the police that she 
got her husband calmed down, climbed out of the bathtub, put on his robe, and willingly went 
outside with him so that they might go for a drive. (See Tr., p.441, Ls.11-22.) However, by the 
time of trial, her story was very different, as she claimed that she was dragged, still hogtied, out 
of the tub, outside, and across the gravel driveway to Mr. Joy's truck. (Tr., p.288, L.6 - p.289, 
L.4, p.402, L.18 p.404, L.22.) This trial testimony, however, seems rather implausible given 
that she did not have deep scrapes (see Exs.16-24, 26-42 (photos of Mrs. Joy's injuries, primarily 
consisting of bruises) or embedded gravel (see Tr., p.446, Ls. 8-15 (Detective Ellis testifying as 
to some slight scratches one of Mrs. Joy's legs, as well as the fact that there was no dirt or gravel 
embedded in those scratches), as one would expect if she had, in fact, been dragged while 
hogtied, such that all of her body weight was pressing on the skin that was dragging across the 
gravel. 
2 
L.5 - p.297, L.17, p.361, L.16 - p.369, L.14.) Based on Mrs. Joy's claims,6 Mr. Joy was arrested 
(see Tr., p.221, L.18 - p.22, L.5) and charged with three felonies: second degree kidnapping, 
domestic battery, and sexual penetration by a foreign object (R., pp.22-23). 
Prior to Mr. Joy's trial, the State filed a notice of its intent to offer "prior bad act" 
evidence against Mr. Joy pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b ), as well as a motion in 
limine (and a supporting memorandum) seeking a ruling that such evidence was admissible. (See 
Notice of Intent to Produce I.R.E. 404(B) Evidence (Sept. 28, 2009)7; R., pp.67-80 
(memorandum and attachments), p.81 (motion).) The "prior bad act" evidence that the State 
sought to offer concerned the four prior alleged instances of victimization of Mrs. Joy by Mr. Joy 
mentioned above. 8 (See R., pp.67-80 (State's memorandum); Tr., p.29, L.5 - p.54, L.12 (State's 
offer of proof).) Ultimately, the district court granted the State's motion (over a vigorous defense 
objection) and ruled the "prior bad act" evidence admissible under Rule 404(b). (See R., p.97; 
Tr., p.65, L.20 - p. 74, L.12.) 
Also prior to Mr. Joy's trial, the district court was called upon to decide whether the 
defense could gain access to the Joys' computer, which was alleged to contain exculpatory 
evidence-images and movies of the Joys engaged in consensual sex involving bondage (which 
would explain the ligature marks on Mrs. Joy's ankles and wrists on the night that Mr. Joy was 
alleged to have committed the crimes at issue in this case) and the insertion of a dildo into Mrs. 
Joy's anus (which would not only tend to show that any such activity on the night in question 
was consensual, but would also impeach Mrs. Joy's statement to the police that she had never 
6 As is detailed below, Mr. Joy tells a very different story about the events of July 28-29, 2009. 
7 The State's notice is attached to a Motion to Augment Record filed contemporaneously 
herewith. 
8 Just as he disputes Mrs. Joy's version of events on July 28-29, 2009, so too does dispute her 
claims regarding the alleged "prior bad acts." 
3 
consented to a dildo being used in her anus). 9 (See R., p.101 ("Motion to Release Property," i.e., 
computer, to the defense), p.103 (State's motion to quash the defendant's subpoena duces tecum 
for the computer).) Initially, the district court ruled that Mr. Joy was not entitled to access to his 
computer and, thus, discovery of the exculpatory evidence, because the contents of the computer 
would be inadmissible under Idaho Rule of Evidence 412. (See Tr., p.94, Ls.2-21.) Later, when 
the issue was re-raised through Mr. Joy's motion for reconsideration (see R., pp.144-45, 146-50), 
the district court ruled that Mr. Joy was not entitled to discovery of the evidence because the 
contents of the computer would be irrelevant and, therefore, inadmissible under Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 401. (See Tr., p.122, L.21 p.124, L.15.) Later still, when it was learned that Mrs. Joy 
had deleted the relevant images, 10 the question of production of the computer was revisited. This 
time, the district court recognized that the images in question could be relevant, so it ordered 
9 In an interview given a few days after the fact, Mrs. Joy told the police that, on the night of July 
28-29, 2009, Mr. Joy penetrated her anus with a purple, rubbery dildo (as noted, this was 
inconsistent with her previous claim that she had been penetrated vaginally (see note 4, supra)), 
but that "in a consensual sexual encounter, she has never allowed or had Preston perform such an 
act." (R., p.31.) Apparently though, the Joys' computer contained images of Mrs. Joy engaging 
in consensual anal penetration with a dildo, including a video "in which Jennifer Joy was using a 
green and orange dildo anally, while Preston applied a dark colored dildo to Jennifer's vagina" 
and "[t]he audio on the file indicated the encounter was consensual." (PSI Add., p. l 0.) 
10 When the issues concerning the Joys' computer were first argued in open court (on November 
30, 2009), Mrs. Joy gave sworn testimony (as part of an offer of proof) regarding the ownership 
and contents of the computer. (Tr., p.84, L.22 - p.90, L.10.) At that time, she used the present 
tense in describing the images that were stored on the computer. (See Tr., p.87, L.17 p.88, L.6 
("There's lots of photos on it .... [T]here's pictures of me posing, pictures of him having sex 
with me.").) In addition, when the district court explicitly instructed her not to tamper with the 
contents of the computer, neither she nor the prosecutor spoke up to indicate that the images in 
question had been deleted. (See Tr., p.94, Ls.17-25.) However, approximately two weeks later, 
when it came to light that Mrs. Joy had deleted the images in question, she apparently 
represented that she had done so long ago-"close in time to after the incident," according to the 
prosecutor. (Tr., p.131, Ls.2-15.) Thus, it is not entirely clear whether Mrs. Joy testified falsely at 
the November 30, 2009 hearing when she spoke of the images in the present tense, or whether 
she violated the district court's order not to tamper with those images. It appears, however, that 
she testified falsely. A subsequent partial forensic examination of the Joys' computer by the 
State's expert revealed that Mrs. Joy deleted images on October 17, 2009-well in advance of 
the November 30, 2009 hearing wherein she led everyone to believe that the images in question 
were still on the computer. 
4 
Mrs. Joy to turn the computer over to the State to determine what data could be recovered. (R., 
pp.168-70, 171; Tr., p.132, L.14 - p.134, L.12.) Finally, after the State had conducted a 
preliminary forensic examination of the computer uncovering images of Mrs. Joy engaged in 
various sex acts, including use of a dildo, but not uncovering any images of Mrs. Joy engaged in 
sexual bondage (see Tr., p.141, Ls.9-13, p.143, Ls.9-22), 11 the district court, again recognizing 
that the images on the computer might be relevant and admissible, continued the trial so that the 
State could complete its forensic examination. 12 (Tr., p.150, Ls.5-20.) 
At trial, the State made much of Mr. Joy's alleged "prior bad acts,'' discussing them in its 
opening statement (Tr., p.187, L.13 - p.188, L.18), and eliciting extensive testimony from Mrs. 
Joy about them (Tr., p.260, L.22 - p.278, L.4). The State also offered Mrs. Joy's testimony as to 
her version of events on the night of July 28-29, 2009 (see Tr., p.278, L.5 - p.297, L.17, p.361, 
L.16 - p.369, L.14), as well as a number of prior consistent statements from Mrs. Joy (offered 
through various witnesses, including Mrs. Joy herself) (see Tr., p.321, L.5 - p.327, L.13 
(testimony of Dr. Anthony Russo, the emergency room doctor who treated Mrs. Joy on July 29, 
2009, as to the statements made by Mrs. Joy), p.411, L.3 - p.416, L.8 (testimony of Mrs. Joy, 
11 The prosecutor, Arthur Verharen, presented to the district court and the defense a very 
misleading picture of what had been discovered in the forensic examination of the computer. The 
prosecutor led the district court and defense counsel to believe that there were no images of Mrs. 
Joy engaged in consensual sexual activity with Mr. Joy on the computer, and that any images 
involving a dildo involved one other than the purple dildo that was allegedly used in this case 
(see Tr., p.141, Ls.9-13, p.143, L.9 - p.145, L.l; see also Tr., p.145, L.2 - p.147, L.25 
(prosecutor failing to correct the district court's misapprehensions when the district court stated 
its understanding of the prosecutor's offer of proof concerning the images found by Detective 
Stewart); however, Detective Steven Stewart, the expert who conducted the forensic examination 
of the Joys' computer, wrote in his report that he had told the prosecutor that he found several 
"video files of Preston and Jennifer [Joy] during sexual activity," and that one of these videos 
depicted Mrs. Joy "using a green and orange dildo anally, while Preston applied a dark colored 
dildo [which he thought was purple] to Jennifer's vagina." (PSI Add., p.10.) It is not clear 
whether the prosecutor's statements were calculated to be misleading or, rather, were simply the 
result of an honest mistake that went uncorrected. 
12 The record does not disclose whether the State ever completed that examination and, if so, 
what was discovered and whether those findings were conveyed to the defense. 
5 
reading significant portions of her own preliminary hearing testimony to the jury), p.455, L.11 -
p.461, L. l (testimony of Detective Albert March, reciting the contents of Mrs. Joy's statement to 
the police) ). 13 
In his defense, Mr. Joy called Jonathan Joy, his son, who testified that, with regard to one 
of the alleged "prior bad acts" (the one allegedly occurring on July 19, 2009) Mrs. Joy had been 
drinking and was the one who was being violent toward Mr. Joy, slapping him in the chest. (Tr., 
p.488, L.3 -p.491, L.13.) 
Mr. Joy also offered his own testimony. (See generally Tr., p.502, L.11 - p.529, L.16, 
p.542, L.14 - p.651, L.16.) During direct examination, Mr. Joy discussed most of the alleged 
"prior bad acts" (those alleged to have occurred on April 10, 2009, July 3-4, 2009, and July 9, 
2009), asserting that Mrs. Joy's testimony as to those incidents was untrue. (See Tr., p.504, L.17 
-p.510, L.10.) In each instance, Mr. Joy described his wife as having become violent with him, 
and in most cases, he indicated that this violent behavior on Mrs. Joy's part followed a bout of 
drinking. (See Tr., p.504, L.17 - p.510, L. l 0.) 
With regard to the incident that is at issue in this case-the one occurring on July 28-29, 
2009-Mr. Joy told a very different story than that which was told by Mrs. Joy. Mr. Joy testified 
that once again, Mrs. Joy was drunk14 and, once again, she initiated the physical violence. (See 
13 It was critical for the prosecution to attempt to bolster the credibility of Mrs. Joy in any way 
that it could-including by highlighting any consistencies in her statements-because she and 
Mr. Joy were the only eyewitnesses to the events in question, and Mrs. Joy had made so many 
inconsistent statements to the police that even the prosecutor had to acknowledge that she would 
"be impeached six ways from Sunday in this case about her statements to law enforcement." (Tr., 
p.147, Ls.1-10; see also Tr., p.147, Ls.14-17 (discussing the "enormity of the impeachment 
available to the defense in this case").) Indeed, the prosecutor at one point had to admit that this 
case "certainly isn't an open-and-shut type of case." (Tr., p.65, Ls.1-19 .) 
14 Even Mrs. Joy admitted to drinking on the night of July 28, 2009, although she appears to have 
downplayed the amount of alcohol she had consumed. (Compare Tr., p.278, L.24 - p.279, L.5 
(Mrs. Joy testifying that she had had "[l]ike about three glasses of wine") and Tr., p.212, Ls.16-
22 (Tami Wiitala, Mrs. Joy's sister-in-law testifying that Mrs. Joy had consumed two to three 
glasses of wine) with Tr., p.446, L.23 - p.44 7, L.5 (Deputy Shardell Ellis, one of the first officers 
6 
Tr., p.517, L.12 - p.529, L.15, p.543, L.l - p.556, L.15.) Mr. Joy explained that as soon as he 
came home on the evening of July 28, 2009, Mrs. Joy attacked him-presumably because she 
was jealous that he had continued to spend time with a woman whom he had seen while he and 
Mrs. Joy had been separated a few months earlier. (See Tr., p.510, L.11 - p.518, L.11; see also 
Tr., p.278, Ls.19-23 (Mrs. Joy acknowledging that she was upset because she found out that Mr. 
Joy "had been texting his girlfriend again").) At that point, Mr. Joy says he went into defensive 
mode, attempting to block Mrs. Joy's blows and maneuver away from her. (Tr., p.518, L.1 -
p.520, L.1.) Eventually, Mr. Joy went into their house and into the master bedroom, with Mrs. 
Joy following behind, continuing to yell at him and strike him. (Tr., p.520, L.2-p.521, L.14.) At 
that point, Mr. Joy says he told his wife he had had "enough" (referring to her empty promises to 
end her violent behavior and follow up with alcohol treatment), and that he was going to leave 
the marriage. (Tr., p.521, L.12 - p.522, L.17.) He says that this made his wife even more angry 
and she threatened that "if [he] left her she was gonna take all [he has] and all [he's] ever gonna 
have." (Tr., p.522, Ls.18-24.) Then, as Mr. Joy was on the floor packing a bag, Mrs. Joy 
viciously blind-sided him with a knee to the mouth and began stomping on him. (Tr., p.522, L.25 
- p.524, L.24.) Mr. Joy concedes that he kicked at his wife in an effort to get away from her 
stomps, and that after he got up and she rushed him again, he pushed her down. (Tr., p.524, L.25 
- p.526.) Only then was he able to get out of the house. (See Tr., p.526, L.5 - p.527, L.11.) 
However, he says Mrs. Joy followed him, tripping over patio furniture on the back deck and 
tumbling into the lawn; she then got up and threw her glass at him (she missed). (Tr., p.527, L.12 
to respond to the Joy home in the early morning hours of July 29, 2009, testifying that Mrs. Joy 
did not appear to be "all together,'' that "she had obviously been drinking," and that Mrs. Joy 
attributed her poor memory, in part, "to intoxication") and Tr., p.449, Ls.23-24 (Deputy Ellis 
testifying that Mrs. Joy told her that she was "drunk").) Obviously she could not have had just 
three glasses of wine if she started drinking at 6:00 p.m. on the 28th (see Tr., p.390, Ls.17-20) 
and was still clearly intoxicated at around 2:00 a.m. on the 29th when the police arrived (see Tr., 
p.419, L.21 -p.420, L.6). 
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- p.529, L.6.) When that failed, Mrs. Joy again charged her husband; however, he managed to 
sidestep her and her momentum carried her over a short (three-foot) fence and down an 
embankment into some brush. (Tr., p.543, L.3 - p.545, L.17.) As Mrs. Joy climbed back up the 
embankment yelling and swearing, Mr. Joy got in his truck and left. (Tr., p.54, L.18 - p.548, 
L.17.) 
Mr. Joy testified that after leaving for a time-perhaps 45 minutes, he returned home. 
(Tr., p.548, L.21 - p.549, L.23.) He says that when he went into his home, Mrs. Joy was calmer 
than she had been. (See Tr., p.550, L.10 - p.551, L.15.) In fact, when he resumed packing his 
bags, Mrs. Joy repeatedly asked him to stay. (Tr., p.550, L.24 - p.552, L.12.) Although he felt 
bad about it, Mr. Joy initially declined to stay and went back out to his truck. (Tr., p.551, L.23 -
p.552, L.18.) However, when Mr. Joy climbed into his truck, his wife climbed in after him and 
eventually persuaded him to stay. (See Tr., p.552, L.19-p.554, L.4.) 
During the course of his testimony, Mr. Joy admitted that he probably caused his wife's 
black eye when he was trying to fend her off. (Tr., p.558, Ls.14-22, p.639, Ls.l-11.) He also 
admitted that he had a role in the ligature marks on her wrists and ankles, but denied that those 
marks were caused by him tying his wife up on the night in question; he explained that he and 
his wife tend to engage in sexual bondage, and that the marks were actually caused during a bout 
of consensual sex a few days prior. (Tr., p.558, L.23 - p.561, L.16.) Mr. Joy denied causing his 
wife's other bruises and scratches (Tr., p.639, Ls.1-14), raising the inference that those injuries 
had most likely been sustained when Mrs. Joy fell off the back deck, or when she tumbled 
headlong down a brushy embankment. 
At the conclusion of Mr. Joy's trial, the jury acquitted him of the charge of sexual 
penetration by a foreign object and hung on the second degree kidnapping charge, but it found 
him guilty of felony domestic battery. (Tr., p.742, Ls.8-16; R., p.279.) 
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Because the State intended to re-try Mr. Joy on the kidnapping charge, a second trial was 
scheduled. (R., pp.283, 284). However, prior to any retrial, the parties entered into a binding 
conditional plea agreement. (See R., pp.318-21.) Under the terms of that agreement, Mr. Joy 
agreed to enter a guilty plea to the kidnapping charge pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 
U.S. 25 (1970), and, in exchange, the State stipulated to concurrent sentences on the kidnapping 
and domestic battery charges and an aggregate sentence of no more than fifteen years, with ten 
years fixed. (R., pp.319-20.) Mr. Joy specifically reserved his right to appeal all of the district 
court's "pre-trial, trial and post-trial decisions and rulings," the jury's verdict, "and/or any 
procedure or ruling leading up to that verdict or to the sentence .... " (R., p.319; accord Tr., 
p.791, L.19 -p.792, L.8.) Shortly thereafter, the district court accepted the agreement and agreed 
to be bound by it (Tr., p.782, Ls.5-7), Mr. Joy entered a guilty plea in accordance with the 
agreement (Tr., p. 786, Ls.I 0-17, p. 794, Ls.13-19), and the district court accepted that plea (see 
Tr., p.794, L.20- p.795, L.3). 
Following a sentencing hearing, the district court imposed upon Mr. Joy a unified 
sentence of fifteen years, with ten years fixed, for kidnapping, and a concurrent unified sentence 
of ten years, all fixed, for domestic battery, for an aggregate sentence which was the maximum 
under the plea agreement-fifteen years with ten years fixed. (Tr., p.824, Ls.8-22; R., pp.351-
52.) The district court entered its judgment of conviction later that day. (R., pp.351-53.) 
Less than two weeks later, Mr. Joy filed a notice of appeal which was timely from the 
district court's judgment of conviction. (See R., pp.355-58.) On appeal, he contends that: (1) the 
district court erred in allowing the State to present extensive evidence of alleged "prior bad acts" 
at his trial; (2) the district court erred in preventing him from obtaining discovery of certain 
exculpatory evidence (the contents of his computer); (3) the district court committed a host of 
errors in its evidentiary rulings at trial; ( 4) the district court erred in refusing to instruct the jury 
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on certain lesser included offenses; and (5) there was such an accumulation of errors in his trial 
that he was denied a fair trial and, therefore, is entitled to a new trial even if the errors are 
individually harmless. 
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err in allowing the State to present extensive evidence of alleged 
"prior bad acts" at Mr. Joy's trial? 
2. Did the district court err in preventing Mr. Joy from obtaining discovery of certain 
exculpatory evidence? 
3. Did the district court err in a number of its mid-trial evidentiary rulings? 
4. Did the district court err in refusing to instruct the jury on certain lesser included 
offenses? 
5. Did the accumulation of errors in this case deprive Mr. Joy of a fair trial? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erred In Allowing The State To Present Extensive Evidence Of Alleged 
"Prior Bad Acts" At Mr. Joy's Trial 
A. Introduction 
The three felony charges that Mr. Joy faced in this case all arose out of an interaction 
with his wife occurring on the night of July 28-29, 2009. However, at Mr. Joy's trial, the State 
also presented copious evidence concerning "bad acts" committed during four other interactions 
with his wife over the preceding four months-one in late March or early April of 2009, one 
occurring on April 10, 2009, one on July 3-4, 2009, and one on July 19, 2009. The district court 
permitted the State to offer evidence of these "prior bad acts" based on its conclusion that those 
acts were similar to the actions alleged in this case and, therefore, demonstrated some sort of a 
"common scheme or plan" on Mr. Joy's part. 
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Mr. Joy contends that this was error because, no matter how the district court and the 
State may have attempted to characterize it, the simple fact is that this "prior bad act" evidence is 
nothing more than evidence of Mr. Joy's bad character and his propensity to commit crimes. As 
is discussed in detail below, the mere fact that a defendant has committed similar crimes in the 
past does not mean that the "prior bad acts" are necessarily part of any sort of common scheme 
or plan by the defendant. Moreover, even if mere similarity were sufficient to demonstrate a 
common scheme or plan, the fact is that the alleged acts at issue in this case were so dissimilar 
that they could not be construed as evidencing any sort of common scheme or plan. Finally, even 
if the alleged acts are indicative of a common scheme or plan such that they were relevant to a 
proper purpose, it was nevertheless error to admit the "prior bad act" evidence because that 
evidence was so extraordinarily prejudicial, especially when compared to its probative value. 
B. Applicable Legal Standards 
The Idaho Rules of Evidence provide that, generally speaking, evidence of "other crimes, 
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the 
person acted in conformity therewith." I.RE. 404(b). However, such evidence may be admitted 
"for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident ... . "Id. 
Under I.RE. 404(b ), there is a two-tiered analysis for determining the admissibility of 
"prior bad act" evidence. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 (2009). The court must first "determine 
whether there is sufficient evidence to establish the other crime or wrong as fact" and "whether 
the fact of another crime or wrong, if established, would be relevant . . . to a material and 
disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other than propensity." Id. If the evidence is 
insufficient to establish the other crime or wrong as fact, or if the other crime or wrong, even if 
proven, is not relevant to an issue other than character or propensity, it is inadmissible and the 
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inquiry ends. See id. However, if the evidence is sufficient to prove the other crime or wrong, 
and that crime or wrong is relevant to some valid issue, the court must then "engage in a 
balancing under I.R.E. 403 and determine whether the danger of unfair prejudice substantially 
outweighs the probative value of the evidence." Id. 
Turning to the question of the applicable standard of review, the Idaho Court of Appeals 
has held that the district court's determination that the evidence in question is relevant to some 
issue besides the defendant's bad character is reviewed de nova, but the district court's balancing 
of the probative value of the evidence against the unfair prejudice to the defendant is reviewed 
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Afiller, 141 Idaho 148, 150 (Ct. App. 2004). 
C. Specific Facts Related To This Claim 
As noted, Mr. Joy was charged with three felonies based on his alleged conduct on the 
night of July 28-29, 2009. It is the State's contention that an argument between Mr. Joy and his 
wife, beginning in the evening on July 28, 2009, escalated to the point where Mr. Joy shoved 
Mrs. Joy into the tub, stripped her naked, repeatedly held her head under water, punched and 
slapped her, tied her up with a leather boot lace, penetrated her anus with a large purple dildo for 
a time, dragged her in a hogtied position out to his pickup truck, punched her and slapped her 
some more, and drove her to a wooded section of the Joys' property where he threatened to tie 
her to a tree and leave her to die, all before taking her back home and going to bed. (See Tr., 
p.188, L.22 - p.190, L.20 (State's opening argument), p.278, L.5 - p.297, L.17, p.361, L.16 -
p.369, L.14 (Mrs. Joy's testimony).) 
In an attempt to persuade the jury to believe its version of events, the State sought to offer 
evidence concerning four prior incidents wherein Mr. Joy allegedly victimized his wife. (See R., 
pp.67-80, 81; Notice of Intent to Produce I.R.E. 404(B) Evidence (Sept. 28, 2009).) Those four 
incidents were detailed by the State's offer of proof (the testimony of Mrs. Joy) as follows: 
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e1 Mrs. Joy says that one night in late March or early April 2009 she was asleep in 
the bed she shared with Mr. Joy when, sometime around midnight, Mr. Joy woke her up, 
held her arms down, ignored her requests that he "get off," and "sodomized" her 
(apparently, referring to anal intercourse). (Tr., p.29, L.5 - p.31, L.1, p.39, L.4 - p.43, 
L.15.) Mrs. Joy did not call the police or tell anyone about this alleged incident initially. 
(Tr., p.42, L.19-p.43, L.15.) 
e Mrs. Joy says that on April 10, 2009 she was drinking and had come home from 
the bars when she had an argument with her husband; she says that at some point, Mr. 
Joy pushed her down on the couch, straddled her, holding her arms down with his knees 
and his hands, and slapped her back and forth across her face some 30-50 times, leaving 
her with bruised wrists and a fat lip. (Tr., p.31, L.2 - p.33, L.2, p.43, L.16 -p.45, L.12.) 
Mrs. Joy wound up at a hotel that night, where a desk clerk called the police; based on 
that, Mr. Joy was convicted of a misdemeanor. (Tr., p.32, L.22 - p.33, L.2, p.43, Ls.18-
24, p.45, Ls.8-12.) 
• Mrs. Joy says that on the night of July 3-4, 2009 she was again drinking (four to 
five drinks, she says) and again had an argument with Mr. Joy; she says that the argument 
became heated and physical, with both of them shoving one another; she says that the 
argument moved outside, where she began throwing everything out of her husband's 
truck; and she says that eventually Mr. Joy picked her up and threw her down an 
embankment, injuring her wrist. (Tr., p.33, L.3 - p.34, L.16, p.45, L.13 - p.49, L.1.) Mrs. 
Joy did not call the police and, in fact, went back in the house after things cooled down. 
(Tr., p.48, Ls.15-24.) Mr. Joy was the one who wound up leaving that night. (Tr., p.48, 
L.22 - p.49' L.1.) 
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111 Mrs. Joy says that on the night of July 19, 2009 she had been drinking yet again 
when, shortly after climbing into bed, Mr. Joy attacked her-straddling her on the bed and 
holding her arms down while he slapped her back and forth across the face some ten to 
fifteen times, causing some bruising and another fat lip. (Tr., p.34, L.17 - p.37, L.2, p.49, 
L.2-p.54, L.12.) Mrs. Joy did not call the police that night. (Tr., p.53, Ls.7-9.) 
The State initially took a shotgun approach to arguing for admission of the "prior bad 
act" evidence, asserting that the circumstances of the four alleged "prior bad acts" should be 
admitted to: (1) show Mr. Joy's state of mind in "willfully inflict[ing] a traumatic injury upon his 
wife" and in sexually penetrating his wife's anus with a dildo "for the purposes of sexual arousal, 
gratification, or abuse" (R., pp.73-74); (2) prove an "absence of mistake or accident" in Mr. 
Joy's beating of his wife (R., pp.74, 75); (3) "put the situation in context, provide explanation for 
[the] situation between defendant and his wife and corroborate the testimony of defendant's 
wife" and "establish[] the credibility of the victim" (R., p.74); and (4) prove a common scheme 
or plan on Mr. Joy's part (R., pp.74, 75). However, at the hearing on its motion in limine, the 
State focused primarily on it contention that the "prior bad act" evidence showed Mr. Joy's 
mental state; it argued, in relevant part, as follows: 
[Y]ou've got a situation here where the battery in this case-and it's not just the 
slapping. He punched her . . . and did some other things to her to constitute 
battery. I think here you have a common method of battering the victim that is, he 
would restrain her, and while she was restrained he would hit her and he would hit 
her in a particular way. He would slap her with the palm of his hand going one 
direction, and then on the rebound he'd hit her with the back of his hand, and this 
is something he did in the case before this court, it's something that he did on 
repeated occasions in the past, and so I think it goes to establishing a common, for 
want of a better phrase, plan or method of conducting the battery. 
I think the fact that he's restrained her before goes to the kidnapping 
charge. It can go in a couple of different ways. First of all, he's restrained her in 
the past to sodomize her. He's restrained her on this particular occasion ... 
through the use of shoelaces, and then he used a device to sodomize her, so I think 
that's a pertinent fact in terms of the kidnapping that he kept her or seized her for 
the purpose of doing those two acts. I also think that he-this evidence would 
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show that he kept her or seized her, detained her for the purpose of committing 
the batteries in the method that you've heard described by the witness [Mrs. Joy]. 
I think that the third count, the forcible penetration, I think that is also 
pertinent because you have a situation here where he's done the same thing 
before. Now, he didn't tie her up on this other occasion, but, nonetheless, he did 
restrain her arms and he sodomized her, so again, if you look at in terms of 
proving the elements of intent to arouse or appeal to or any of those things, I 
certainly think evidence that he's done it [in] the past goes to intent, it goes to 
motive, all of those factors. 
The other thing I think this evidence will do for a jury is essentially 
explain the situation. If the jury were to hear of the July 28th incident all by itself, 
in other words, not hear about any of the things that took place before, it's really 
not gonna make a lot of sense. It I think would be proper to put the whole 
relationship in context to show how it disintegrated into the situation that arose on 
July 28th' and I think the evidence should be admissible in that regard as well .... 
(Tr., p.57, L.6- p.59, L.3.) 
In granting the State's motion in limine and ruling the "prior bad act" evidence 
admissible, the district court went a different route than that which was urged by the State. The 
district court rejected the State's contention that the "prior bad act" evidence was admissible 
because it was necessary to prove Mr. Joy's intent. (Tr., p.67, L.9 p.68, L.24.) The district 
court reasoned that the acts alleged to underlie the crimes charged, if true, would be sufficient to 
prove the mental states necessary for those offenses. 15 (Tr., p.67, L.9 p.68, L.24.) However, the 
15 The district court cited State v. Stoddard, 105 Idaho 533 (Ct.App. 1983), for this proposition. 
(Tr., p.67, L.9 p.68, L.24.) In Stoddard, a case that pre-dated the Idaho Rules of Evidence, the 
Court of Appeals observed as follows: 
It appears to be a general rule that "[i]n those instances where, from the nature of 
the offense under inquiry, proof of its commission as charged can-ies with it the 
evident implication of a criminal intent, evidence of the perpetration, or attempted 
perpetration, of other like offenses will not be admitted." 29 AM.JUR.2d Evidence 
§ 324 (1967). "In other words, where the act charged against the defendant itself 
characterizes the offense, the guilty intent is proven by proving the act," and 
evidence of other crimes is not necessary or admissible to establish the accused's 
intent. State v. Smith, 103 Wash. 267, 174 P. 9, 9 (1918). 
Stoddard, 105 Idaho at 5 3 7. The Court then went on to hold that in a grand larceny trial, where 
the defendant was accused of stealing a sports car in Boise and driving it to Oregon, it was error 
to admit evidence of his prior theft of another sports car on a prior occasion in order to prove his 
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district court concluded that the "prior bad act" evidence was admissible primarily to show a 
"common scheme or plan" on the part of Mr. Joy. (Tr., p.68, L.23 -p.74, L.8.) 
Although the district court acknowledged that, in the Idaho Supreme Court's then-recent 
decision in State v. Grist, 14 7 Idaho 49 (2009), the Court cautioned trial "courts to tread 
carefully when dealing with common criminal design, common scheme or design, [or] common 
scheme or plan," when proffered by the State as a justification for admission of "prior bad act" 
evidence, 16 it then went on to rely on pre-Grist authority (State v. Hansen, 127 Idaho 675 
(Ct.App. 1995)) for the proposition that, as long as the alleged "prior bad acts" are similar to the 
intent to steal. (Id. at 537-38.) The Court of Appeals reasoned that, because there was ample 
evidence of the defendant's criminal intent, there was no valid reason to introduce such highly 
firejudicial evidence. 
6 In Grist, the Supreme Court repeatedly (no less than five times) admonished Idaho's trial 
courts not to admit "prior bad act" evidence tending to show only the defendant's propensity to 
commit crimes under the guise of "corroboration" evidence or evidence of a "common scheme or 
plan." Initially, the Court stated that "trial courts must carefully scrutinize evidence offered as 
"corroboration" or as demonstrating a "common scheme or plan" in order to avoid the erroneous 
introduction of evidence that is merely probative of the defendant's propensity to engage in 
criminal behavior." Grist, 147 Idaho at 53. Shortly thereafter, it reiterated this admonishment, 
stating "the courts of this state must not permit the introduction of impermissible propensity 
evidence merely by relabeling it as "corroborative" or as evidence of a "common scheme or 
plan." Id. at 53-54. Later, in discussing State v. Tolman, 121 Idaho 899 (1992), the Court 
returned to this issue, observing that "[i]n Tolman, [it had] cautioned against an expansive 
interpretation of 'common scheme or plan,' stating: 'We do not suggest today that any and all 
evidence of prior sexual misconduct is admissible in sex crime cases merely by placing it under 
the rubric of corroborative evidence or a common scheme or plan.'" Grist, 147 Idaho at 54 
(quoting Tolman, 121 Idaho at 905). Thereafter, the Court reiterated its admonishment twice 
more. First, the Court "once again caution[ed] the trial courts of this state that they must 
carefully examine evidence offered for the purpose of demonstrating the existence of a common 
scheme or plan in order to determine whether the requisite relationship exists. Id. at 55. Next, the 
Court issued an instruction that should have been clear: 
Id. 
The trial courts of this state must carefully scrutinize evidence offered under 
I.R.E. 404(b) for purposes of 'corroboration' or as demonstrating a 'common 
scheme or plan' in order to determine whether such evidence actually serves the 
articulated purpose or whether such evidence is merely propensity evidence 
served up under a different name. 
16 
alleged conduct for which the defendant is on trial, evidence of the "prior bad acts" is relevant as 
"common scheme or plan" evidence. (Tr., p.68, L.23 - p.71, L 1.) It ruled, in part, as follows: 
I'm gonna read from State v. Hansen .... "In that case, the allegations of prior 
uncharged sexual misconduct involved the same victim, similar acts committed 
within a relatively brief span of time," end of quote, and I think that's exactly 
what we're dealing with here as far as the slapping is concerned, as far as the 
restraint on prior occasions maybe not with shoelaces but with arms and legs, and 
as far as penetration of the victim against her will on a prior occasion at least, and 
all of those events that I've heard of took place between the end of March 2009 
and the end of July 2009, so we're talking four months, four months at most, 
some or one event occurring within the same month, and so because of the 
similarity, I'm going to allow it in . 
. . . . I don't think that this evidence is improper given the use that I've mentioned, 
and it really is the common scheme or plan use, so that's why it's relevant. 
(Tr., p.69, L.19-p.71, L.L) 
The district court may have also found the "prior bad act" relevant to show the context of 
the alleged crimes. Again relying on pre-Grist authority, the district court ruled as follows: 
"Any evidence of other crimes which developed was so intimately and 
inseparably connected with the circumstances of this specific offense as to render 
it admissible as a part of the common criminal design, all of which was 
necessarily admissible in order to get a clear understanding of the situation of the 
parties and the probable truth or falsity of this charge," end of quote, and I think 
that's what we 're dealing with here, and essentially that's what the Vermont 
case17 says, the Hawaii case18 says is in domestic abuse situations like this, and 
17 It appears that the district court was referring to State v. Sanders, 716 A.2d 11 (Vt. 1998), a 
case cited by the State. (See R., pp.69-69.) Sanders is a bizarre opinion wherein the Supreme 
Court of Vermont went outside the recognized uses of "prior bad act" evidence, as enumerated in 
Vermont Rule of Evidence 404(b ), and carved out a special exception for a certain class of cases. 
It held that, given the unique nature of domestic violence, where abuser's actions are '"learned, . 
. . controlling behavior aimed at gaining another's compliance' through multiple incidents," and 
where "[ v ]ictims ... are likely to change their stories out of fear of retribution, or even out of 
misguided affection," previous instances of domestic violence should be shared with the jury, 
lest the jurors find the victim's story "'incongruous and incredible."' Sanders, 716 A.2d at 13. In 
short, the Supreme Court of Vermont appears to have re-written the rules of evidence for a 
narrow class of highly emotional cases in an effort to make it easier for the State of Vermont to 
obtain convictions in those cases. Obviously, such an approach could never stand in Idaho 
following the Supreme Court's decision in Grist. 
18 It appears that the district court was referring to State v. Clark, 926 P .2d 194 (Hawaii 1996), 
another case cited by the State. (R., p.68.) In Clark, the Supreme Court of Hawaii held that the 
history of the domestic relationship, including instances of prior domestic violence, were 
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especially where the charged conduct is so aberrant that it would be difficult for 
jurors to place that conduct or reconcile that conduct out of context unless you 
have some understanding of what the overall relationship has been like, at least in 
the four months prior to this event. 
(Tr., p.73, L.9-p.74, L.2 (quoting Hansen (quoting State v. Moore, 120 Idaho 743 (1991))).) 
Having found the "prior bad act" evidence relevant based on its purported similarity to 
the State's evidence concerning the crimes charged, or perhaps to put the night in question in 
context, the district court then went on to weigh the probative value of that evidence against its 
prejudicial effect. (Tr., p.71, L.2 - p.72, L.19.) In doing so, the district court reasoned that the 
"prior bad act" evidence was highly probative for two reasons: first, the State's case was 
relatively weak, in that the only direct evidence against Mr. Joy was the testimony of Mrs. Joy; 
second, the allegations concerning the "prior bad acts" involved "very similar facts" to the 
allegations concerning the crimes charged, and "[t]hey [were] very close in time." (Tr., p.71, 
Ls.7-22, p.72, Ls.4-8, 13-19.) The district court then dispatched with any concerns about unfair 
prejudice (which it recognized as the danger that the jury would take the "prior bad act" evidence 
for propensity purposes (Tr., p. 71, Ls.2-6)) with the conclusory statement that "any unfair 
prejudice can be cured with a limiting instruction."19 (Tr., p.71, L.25 - p.72, L.1; accord Tr., 
relevant to the issue of why the victim would recant her original allegations when called by the 
state to testify at her abuser's trial. Id. at 204-07. 
19 The limiting instruction ultimately given (Instruction No. 14b) was not tailored to the evidence 
or the purpose for which it was actually admitted. Rather, it was the generic Rule 404(b) limiting 
instruction (ICJI 303); it stated as follows: 
Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the 
defendant committed acts other than that for which the defendant is on trial. 
Such evidence, if believed, is not to be considered by you to prove the 
defendant's character or that the defendant has a disposition to commit crimes. 
Such evidence may be considered by you only for the limited purpose of 
proving the defendant's motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity or absence of mistake or accident. 
(R., p.269.) 
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p. 72, Ls.8-10.) In light of the district court's ruling, copious "prior bad act" evidence was offered 
against Mr. Joy at trial. 
D. The District Court Erred In Admitting The "Prior Bad Act" Evidence 
1. The District Court Erred In Its Determination That The "Prior ~ad Act" Evidence 
Was Relevant To Any Proper (Non-Propensity) Issue 
The district court found the "prior bad act" evidence to be relevant, primarily because it 
believed that this evidence was indicative of some sort of a "common scheme or plan" on Mr. 
Joy's part. However, the district court also arguably found the "prior bad act" evidence relevant 
to show the context of the alleged crime in this case. For the following reasons, the district 
court's relevance analysis was fatally flawed. 
a) Common Scheme Or Plan 
Beginning with the district court's "common scheme or plan" rationale, it is readily 
apparent that the district court erred. When it comes to "prior bad act" evidence, the Idaho 
Supreme Court has explained that such evidence is only eligible for admission at trial if it is 
"relevant to a material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other than propensity." 
Grist, 147 Idaho at 52 (emphasis added). Of course, one such non-propensity issue that may be 
"material and disputed" in a given case is whether the defendant committed the crime in question 
as part of a "common scheme or plan." See I.RE. 404(b); Grist, 147 Idaho at 54-55. The Court 
has described a "common scheme or plan" as a "common scheme or plan embracing the 
commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the 
other." State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 750-51 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. 
Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991)) (quoted with approval in Grist, 147 Idaho at 54-55) (emphasis 
added). In light of these authorities, it should be clear that the "prior bad act" evidence utilized in 
this case was not relevant to show a "common scheme or plan." 
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First, given that neither the State, nor the district, ever even attempted to articulate any 
sort of alleged scheme or plan20 on Mr. Joy's part, it cannot be said that any such scheme or plan 
was both "material" and "disputed" in this case. Further, there is absolutely no evidence 
suggesting that Mr. Joy ever developed a "common scheme or plan embracing the commission 
of two or more crimes" against his wife. In fact, the State's evidence, if believed, shows just the 
opposite to be true. Mrs. Joy testified that four of Mr. Joy's five alleged "prior bad acts" occurred 
when Mr. Joy lost his temper and acted out of anger. (Tr., p.260, L.22 - p.269, L.3 (Mrs. Joy 
testifying that the April 10, 2009 incident involved alcohol and an argument), p.271, L.20 -
p.274, L.18 (Mrs. Joy testifying that the July 3-4, 2009 incident also involved alcohol and an 
argument, and admitting that she was physical with Mr. Joy,as well), p.274, L.19-p.277, L.24 
(Mrs. Joy testifying that the July 19, 2004 incident involved alcohol, and clearly portraying Mr. 
Joy as being angry), p.278, L.5 - p.280, L.23 (Mrs. Joy testifying that the July 28-29, 2009 
incident began with drinking and an argument).) Likewise, the prosecutor's theory as to why 
Mr. Joy supposedly abused his wife of eight years was that "the marriage had been deteriorating" 
for the preceding few months (Tr., p.187, Ls.5-12), and it got to the point where the couple 
argued a lot and some of those arguments turned physical. 21 (See Tr., p.186, L.11 - p.190, L.20 
20 Mr. Joy contends that the term "plan," as used in Rule 404(b ), should be given its plain, usual, 
and ordinary meaning. Cf State v. Yeoman, 149 Idaho 505, 507 (2010) (holding that, in 
interpreting a statute, the words used in the statute "must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary 
meaning"). The plain, usual, and ordinary meaning of the term "plan" is "a scheme or method of 
acting, doing, proceeding, making, etc., developed in advance" (Dictionary.com (last visited 
Dec. 20, 2011)), which, of course, suggests a prospectively-formed intent to do some act or 
accomplish some objective. Likewise, the term "scheme,'' as used in the case law interpreting 
Rule 404(b ), assuming it is also given its plain, usual, and ordinary meaning, also suggests 
prospectively-formed intent to do some act or accomplish some objective. It is defined as "a 
plan, design, or program of action to be followed; project." (Dictionary.com (last visited Dec. 20, 
2011).) 
21 Even in closing arguments-after the district court had admitted the "prior bad act" evidence 
as relevant to a "common plan or scheme"-the prosecutor failed to argue that the five alleged 
instances of physical and sexual abuse of Mrs. Joy were part of any sort of larger plan by Mr. 
Joy. (See Tr., p.670, L.12 - p.681, L.13, p.688, L.20 -p.691, L.2.) 
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(State's opening argument), p.678, Ls.22-23 (State's closing argument, asserting that Mr. Joy did 
what he supposedly did because "[h]e was angry at her [Mrs. Joy]"). Thus, the simple fact is that 
even if Mr. Joy did all of what the State says he did, he did it in spontaneous fits of anger, not in 
furtherance of any kind of ongoing plan or scheme. 
Second, it cannot be said that just because the defendant's "prior bad acts" were similar 
to the charged offense, there must have been a common plan or scheme at work. Such an 
assumption overlooks the plain meaning of the words "plan" and "scheme," which both require 
prospectively-formed intent to do some act or accomplish some objective. (See note 20, supra.) 
Such an assumption also overlooks the Idaho Supreme Court's construction of the "common 
scheme or plan" exception to Rule 404(b)'s prohibition on admission of "prior bad act" 
evidence. The Court has made it clear that the scheme or plan itself must have "embrac[ed] the 
commission of two or more crimes." Pizzuto, 119 Idaho at 750 (quoted in Grist, 147 Idaho at 54-
55). In other words, there is no common scheme or plan within the meaning of Rule 404(b) when 
the actions in question-although they may be strikingly similar-were spontaneously 
undertaken or, even if not spontaneous, were undertaken without an eye to some common 
objective. Accordingly, the district court erred when it concluded that, just because Mr. Joy's 
alleged crime was similar to his alleged "prior bad acts," all were necessarily committed in 
furtherance of some sort of common scheme or plan.22 (See Tr., p.69, L.19 p.71, L.l 
22 It appears that the district court's error stems from its erroneous interpretation of the portion of 
Pizzuto (as quoted in Grist) wherein the Supreme Court spoke of a common scheme or plan as 
being "a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to 
each other that proof of one tends to establish the other .... " (See Tr., p.69, L.9 p.70, L.8.) It 
appears that the district court focused solely on the last phrase in the quote ("two or more crimes 
so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the other") and interpreted it to say 
that as long as two crimes appear related to each other (based on similarities), they meet the 
definition of a "common scheme or plan." However, such a reading of this portion of Pizzuto is 
plainly incorrect. First, it ignores the first portion of the clause in question ("a common scheme 
or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes"), as well as the plain meaning of the 
terms "scheme" and "plan." Second, it incorrectly interprets the relationship requirement as 
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("[B]ecause of the similarity, I'm going to allow it in.").) To hold otherwise would be to change 
the plain meaning of the phrase "common scheme or plan," and create an end-run around the 
limitations of Rule 404(b ). It would also allow parties to offer evidence that is "merely 
propensity evidence served up under a different name"-precisely the evil that the Idaho 
Supreme Court has cautioned against. Grist, 147 Idaho at 55. 
Third, assuming arguendo that mere factual similarity is sufficient to bring "prior bad 
act" evidence within the ambit of the "common scheme or plan" exception to Rule 404(b ), the 
fact is that the district court was mistaken when it found Mr. Joy's alleged "prior bad acts" to be 
similar to the alleged actions underlying his charges in this case. They were not similar at all. 
Turning first to the incident of late March/early April 2009, as noted, Mrs. Joy claims that 
her husband crawled into bed and began having anal intercourse with her as she slept, and that he 
refused to stop despite her protestations. This is nothing like the abuse that Mrs. Joy contends she 
suffered on July 28-29, 2009, where she says that an argument escalated to the point where she 
was slapped, punched, held underwater, tied up, dragged outside by her hair, and driven around 
the Joy property where she was threatened with the prospect of being tied to a tree in the woods 
and being left to die. The only potential similarity is that Mr. Joy allegedly penetrated his wife's 
anus against her will; however, during the March/ April incident it was alleged that he did so with 
his penis, whereas on July 28-29, he supposedly did so with a purple dildo. 
With regard to the incident of April 10, 2009, Mrs. Joy claims that an argument with her 
husband evolved into physical violence involving Mr. Joy slapping her some 30-50 times in the 
face. Again, there is little similarity to the events of the July 28-29, 2009. While the April 10, 
2009 incident did begin as an argument, just like the July 28-29, 2009 incident, the abuse alleged 
being satisfied by mere similarity, even though the Pizzuto Court spoke of the crimes or acts 
being "related to each other" in the sense that they were committed in furtherance of some actual 
plan or scheme. 
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was quite minimal relative to the abuse alleged on July 28-29, 2009. There is no allegation that 
Mr. Joy struck his wife with a closed fist, pulled her hair, tied her up, attempted to drown her, 
violated her sexually, drove her around their property, or threatened to leave her to die. 
The incident of July 3-4, 2009, appears to have involved a third distinct set of alleged 
circumstances. There, although the incident is alleged to have been somewhat similar to that of 
April 10, 2009 and July 28-29, 2009, in that it allegedly began with an argument, it took a very 
different tum than either of the other incidents. First, Mrs. Joy admitted that she was being 
physical with her husband. Second, Mrs. Joy has not alleged that Mr. Joy struck her~either with 
the palm of his hand or a closed fist, much less tied her up, violated her sexually, etc.; she claims 
only that Mr. Joy picked her up and threw her down an embankment which, of course, is not 
something that was alleged to have been done on July 28-29, 2009. 
Finally, the incident of July 19, 2009, is alleged to have been fairly unique as well. This 
time, Mrs. Joy claims that there was no argument; she tells a story of her husband exploding with 
anger and becoming violent immediately. With regard to the violence alleged, Mrs. Joy tells a 
story that appears similar to her story regarding the April 10, 2009 incident (she contends that 
she was restrained and slapped, although far fewer times than on April I 0, 2009); however, the 
similarity of her story to that of the incident of April 10, 2009, makes it dissimilar to her story 
concerning the events of July 28-29, 2009 (for the reasons discussed above). 
The fact is that evidence of the incidents of late March/early April 2009, April 10, 2009, 
July 3-4, 2009, and July 19, 2009, told the jury nothing of relevance to this case, which involved 
an incident occurring on July 28-29, 2009; it informed the jury only that Mr. Joy is a bad guy 
who has done mean things to his wife and, therefore, is probably guilty of having done mean 
things to her on July 28-29, 2009. 
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b) Context 
As noted above, it is not entirely clear, but the district court appears to have found that 
the "prior bad act" evidence was relevant, not only to show a "common scheme or plan," but also 
to put the facts of this case in context. The district court concluded that "the charged conduct is 
so aberrant that it would be difficult for jurors to place that conduct or reconcile that conduct out 
of context unless you have some understanding of what the overall relationship has been like, at 
least in the four months prior to this event." (Tr., p.73, L.22 - p.74, L.2.) 
To the extent that this was the district court's ruling, it was unprecedented and it is 
wholly unsupportable. First, there is nothing that is particularly confusing or difficult to 
understand about Mrs. Joy's allegations concerning the night of July 28-29, 2009. There is no 
reason to believe that domestic violence is beyond the ken of the average juror. Furthermore, 
even if the particular allegations in this case (e.g., anal penetration with a dildo) are somehow so 
"aberrant" as to :flummox the jurors, the "prior bad acts" testified to by Mrs. Joy would have 
done nothing to have dispelled the jurors' confusion. As noted above, the "prior bad acts" 
alleged by Mrs. Joy were far less egregious than the acts she described as occurring on the night 
of July 28-29, 2009. In other words, the evidence concerning the alleged "prior bad acts" did not 
explain anything for the jury; it simply portrayed the defendant as a bad man who tends to abuse 
his wife. 
Second, to the extent that the district court was less concerned about confusion per se, 
and more concerned that the jurors simply would not believe Mrs. Joy's tale unless they also 
knew of Mr. Joy's purported history of abusing his wife, the district court admitted the "prior bad 
act" evidence for the very purpose for which it is expressly prohibited-to show Mr. Joy's 
propensity to commit crime. As the Grist Court explained, it is impermissible to admit "prior bad 
act" evidence to corroborate the victim's testimony where the theory is simply that, if he 
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committed pnor offenses, he probably committed the present offense and, therefore, the 
complaining witness is probably telling the truth. Grist, 14 7 Idaho at 54. The flaw with this 
reasoning is that it rests on the "unstated premise" that: "If he did it before, he probably did it 
this time as well," which represents a complete reliance on the defendant's propensity to commit 
crimes. Id. And, obviously, "[e]vidence of uncharged misconduct may not be admitted pursuant 
to I.R.E. 404(b) when its probative value is entirely dependent upon its tendency to demonstrate 
the defendant's propensity to engage in such behavior." Id. 
Third, insofar as the district court attempted to follow the lead of State v. Sanders, 716 
A.2d 11 (Vt. 1998), and concluded that the circumstances and background of the domestic 
relationship are always relevant in a domestic violence case (see Tr., p.73, L.3 - p.74, L.2), the 
district court went a route that was expressly forbidden in Grist. As the Grist Court noted, the 
standards regarding admission of I.R.E. 404(b) ("prior bad act") evidence are the same in every 
case, regardless of the type. See Grist, 147 Idaho at 51, 55. 
Put simply, the context (in terms of the recent turbulence in the Joys' relationship) in 
which the events of July 28-29, 2009 unfolded is simply not relevant to the question of whether 
Mr. Joy committed the crimes that he was charged with. 
2. Probative Value vs. Prejudicial Effect 
As noted, if "prior bad act" evidence is not relevant to an issue other than the defendant's 
bad character or propensity to commit crime, it is inadmissible and the inquiry ends there. See 
Grist, 147 Idaho at 52. However, if such evidence is found to be relevant to a proper (non-
propensity) consideration, the next step in the analysis is to determine whether the probative 
value of that "prior bad act" evidence is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Id. 
Assuming this Court even reaches the probative value vs. prejudice analysis, Mr. Joy 
contends that it should conclude that the district court erred in its conclusion that the probative 
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value of the extensive evidence concerning Mr. Joy's "prior bad acts" was not substantially 
outweighed by the prejudicial effect of admission of that evidence. Below, Mr. Joy analyzes first 
the probative value of the evidence in question, then prejudicial effect of that evidence. 
a) Probative Value 
Initially, it should be noted that the district court's assessment of the probative value of 
the "prior bad act" evidence in this case missed the mark. Although the district court concluded 
that the "prior bad act" evidence in this case was relevant because it showed some sort of 
"common scheme or plan" by Mr. Joy, when it went on to evaluate the probative value of this 
evidence, it seemingly abandoned its "common scheme or plan" rationale. 23 Rather than focusing 
on whatever plan or scheme was supposedly hatched by Mr. Joy, the district court found that the 
"prior bad act" evidence was highly probative of Mr. Joy's guilt because: (1) "the State's case is, 
in the grand scheme of things, relatively weak in that there is a lack of evidence, no direct 
evidence, no eyewitness other than the victim"24; and (2) the "prior bad act evidence" involves 
"very similar facts," and incidents that "are very close in time," to the crimes alleged. (Tr., p.71, 
Ls.2-22.) However, the strength of the prosecution case (or lack thereof) is wholly irrelevant to 
the question of whether the "prior bad act" is probative of any fact tending to show the 
defendant's guilt. Moreover, as discussed above, the factual similarities between, and the 
temporal proximity of, the alleged "prior bad acts" and the alleged crimes does nothing but raise 
the inference that, "[i]f he did it before, he probably did it this time as well," which goes only to 
propensity. Grist, 147 Idaho at 54. 
23 By quickly abandoning its "common scheme or plan" rationale, the district court betrayed the 
fact that its basis for finding the "prior bad act" evidence to be relevant was simply not credible, 
and that it "permit[ted] the introduction of impermissible propensity evidence merely by 
relabeling it as ... evidence of a 'common scheme or plan.'" Grist, 147 Idaho at 53-54. 
24 As is discussed below, the relative weakness of the State's case is a fact which actually makes 
the "prior bad act" evidence more prejudicial and should, therefore, tends to support an 
inadmissibility ruling. 
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Stepping outside the district court's flawed analysis, it is readily apparent that the "prior 
bad act" evidence in this case had negligible probative value, if any at all. Turning first to the 
purported "common scheme or plan," as noted above, neither the State, nor the district court, has 
ever identified, or provided evidence of, any actual scheme or plan to victimize Mrs. Joy. Thus, 
the alleged "prior bad acts," assuming they actually occurred, are nothing more than isolated 
instances of Mr. Joy behaving badly. As such, they are not relevant to the question of whether 
Mr. Joy committed the crimes charged in this case. 
Insofar as Mr. Joy's alleged "prior bad acts" are relevant to the background of his 
marriage, they in no way inform the question of whether Mr. Joy committed the crimes alleged 
to have occurred on July-28-29, 2009. Unless, that is, one takes the view that if Mr. Joy did it 
before, he probably did it this time. However, this would be to use the "prior bad act" evidence 
as evidence of propensity which, as is argued above, is plainly improper. 
b) Prejudicial Effect 
All "prior bad act" evidence is inherently prejudicial. Cooke v. State, 149 Idaho 233, 241 
(Ct.App. 2010); State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho 210, 221 (Ct.App. 2009). That should go without 
saying. Thus, the real question in any case is how prejudicial the "prior bad act" evidence is. 
In this case, the "prior bad act" evidence was copious. As noted, in addition to testifying 
about the circumstances of the alleged offenses, Mrs. Joy detailed four separate and distinct 
"prior bad acts" by her husband which, if true, would not only be highly disturbing to the 
average juror, but would actually be criminal in their own right. Further, the State made much of 
the alleged "prior bad acts," highlighting them in its opening statement, and offering Mrs. Joy's 
fairly extensive testimony on them. This was a lot for Mr. Joy to have to defend against. See 
State v. Gomez, 151 Idaho 146, _, 254 P.3d 47, 62 (Ct.App. 2011) (Gutierrez, J., dissenting) 
("The number of instances of uncharged [ ] misconduct ... is also important to consider under 
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[a] Rule 403 analysis. Gomez was forced to defend himself not only against V.B.'s accusations 
regarding one incident but also against her testimony, as well as the testimony of her sisters and 
friend, regarding allegations beginning in 1996 and stretching through 2006."). "As such, there 
was a high risk that the sheer amount of evidence of uncharged ... misconduct took 'the jury 
away from their primary consideration of the guilt or innocence of the particular crime on trial."' 
Id. (Guttierez, J., dissenting) (quoting Grist, 147 Idaho at 52, 205 P.3d at 1188). Indeed, when it 
came time to present his case at trial, Mr. Joy offered one witnesses (Jonathan Joy, Mr. Joy's 
son) whose testimony was offered solely to rebut one of the alleged "prior bad acts." (See Tr., 
p.484, L.2 - p.491, L.20.) In addition, Mr. Joy was forced to testify extensively about the alleged 
"prior bad acts" in an effort to rebut his wife's claims. (See Tr., p.504, L.17 - p.510, L.10, p.581, 
L.11 - p.582, L.20, p.589, L.16 - p.596, L.22, p.649, L.24 - p.650, L.2, p.650, L.19 - p.651, 
L.7.) In the process, he wound up opening the door to the State introducing an additional 
damning fact-he pied guilty to a misdemeanor charge based on the April 10, 2009 incident-
which was yet another thing that he then had to try to explain to the jury. (Tr., p.581, L.11 -
p.587, L.1, p.589, Ls.12-20, p.650, L.19 - p.651, L.7.) In short, the "prior bad evidence" issue 
was one colossal, highly prejudicial distraction that diverted the jury's focus from the only real 
question for the jury-whether Mr. Joy committed the crimes alleged to have occurred on July 
28-29, 2009. 
Furthermore, both the State and the district court recognized from the outset that the 
"prior bad act" evidence had the potential to make the difference in Mr. Joy's case because this 
case is the prototypical "he said/she said" type of case. In arguing for admission of this evidence, 
the State conceded that its case was relatively weak because of a lack of eyewitnesses to the 
alleged events of July 28-29, 2009. It argued as follows: 
And in terms of the strength of the case, of the State's case, there are no 
witnesses to the incident on July 28th. No one else saw this happen. In terms of the 
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State's expected evidence, it will be that of the victim .... [T]here really [are] no 
other witnesses other than what the victim said happened, so, you know, I'm not 
sure it's as strong as the defense makes it out to be. In my view it certainly isn't 
an open-and-shut type of case. I think there's plenty of room here, and I don't 
think it's as strong as the defense has said, so, you know, if that's at all relevant, 
I'm not really sure how it is. I guess there is some Idaho law that says perhaps that 
is a component of the analysis. I do think the State's case here isn't all that strong 
as the defense has made it out to be, and from that aspect I think you ought to let 
this evidence in. 
(Tr., p.65, Ls.1-19.) Later, in ruling the "prior bad act" admissible, the district court made similar 
observations: "so the State's case is, in the grand scheme of things, relatively weak in that there 
is a lack of evidence, no direct evidence, no eyewitness other than the victim." (Tr., p.71, Ls.15-
18). Further, it was readily apparent very early on in this case that Mrs. Joy's credibility was 
open to doubt. The prosecutor conceded as follows: 
There are a number of statements that Ms. Joy made to law enforcement 
that she's going to be impeached on. I can go through her initial interview with 
Deputy Ellis and I could pick out quite a few statements that she made to Deputy 
Ellis that are different than she made to Detective March, statements that she 
made to Deputy Ellis that are completely different than what she testified to at the 
preliminary hearing. She's going to be impeached six ways from Sunday in this 
case about her statements to law enforcement. . . . I mean even just a casual 
glance at Deputy Ellis' police report, Detective March's police report and the 
preliminary hearing illustrates the enormity of the impeachment available to the 
defense in this case .... 
(Tr., p.147, Ls.1-17.) In light of all of this, it is readily apparent that there was a tremendous risk 
that the jury would use the "prior bad act" evidence as the tiebreaker in determining who to 
believe, reasoning that if Mr. Joy had committed violent acts before, he probably did this time 
and, therefore, Mrs. Joy must be telling the truth. This is not just unfair prejudice, it is 
overwhelmingly unfair prejudice. 
Although the district court concluded that "any unfair prejudice can be cured with a 
limiting instruction" (Tr., p.71, L.23 - p.72, L.1, p.72, Ls.8-10), that conclusion was incorrect. 
Admittedly, a limiting instruction such as the pattern instruction (ICJI 303) that was given in this 
case (Instruction No. 14b) (see R., p.269), may diminish, to an extent, the risk of unfair prejudice 
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attendant to the admission of "prior bad act" evidence. See Gomez, 254 P.3d at 57. However, 
such an instruction does not automatically eliminate all prejudice; nor does it necessarily reduce 
the prejudice to a tolerable level. See State v. Pokorney, 149 Idaho 459, 466 (2010) ("Even with 
a limiting instruction, there was a high risk that the jury would convict Pokorney based upon 
propensity and sexual deviancy. We are constrained to conclude that the unfair prejudice 
substantially outweighed the probative value of the evidence."); see also State v. Johnson, 148 
Idaho 664, 669-70 (2010) (holding that error in admitting "prior bad act" evidence was 
prejudicial even though a limiting instruction had been given); State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 
229 n.3 (2008) (noting in dicta that the pattern jury instruction, when it failed to specifically 
identify the "prior bad act" in question, was "probably not sufficient to ameliorate the likelihood 
of unfair prejudice" attendant to admission of that evidence). 
In view of the circumstances of this case-four separate instances of alleged "prior bad 
acts" covering very serious and disturbing conduct (one anal rape and three serious domestic 
batteries), all of which were discussed at great length throughout the trial, and "he said/she said" 
credibility question at the core of the case-it is unfathomable that the jurors would have been 
able to consider the "prior bad act" evidence for the "limited purpose of proving the defendant's 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or 
accident" (R., p.269), especially where that "prior bad act" evidence, was never specifically 
identified and, even had it been, it had no applicability to any of the purposes stated in the 
limiting instruction. In other words, the limiting instruction in this case would have been 
meaningless to the jury.Probative Value vs. Prejudicial Effect 
Mr. Joy submits that because there was little, if any, probative value to the "prior bad act" 
evidence, and because that evidence was so prejudicial-both in its content and in its volume-
and the district court's limiting instruction was a hollow attempt to mitigate its prejudice, the 
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district court abused its discretion in concluding that the unfair prejudice of that "prior bad act" 
evidence did not substantially outweigh its probative value. Therefore, the district court erred in 
ruling that "prior bad act" evidence admissible. 
II. 
The District Court Erred In Preventing Mr. Joy From Obtaining Discoverv Of Certain 
Exculpatory Evidence 
A. Introduction 
Prior to his trial, Mr. Joy sought access (through a subpoena duces tecum) to the 
computer that he and his wife owned. He asserted that the computer contained images of he and 
his wife engaged in consensual sex involving bondage, which would explain the ligature marks 
on Mrs. Joy's ankles and wrists on the night that Mr. Joy was alleged to have committed the 
crimes at issue in this case, as well as the insertion of a dildo into Mrs. Joy's anus, which would 
not only tend to show that any such activity on the night in question was consensual, but would 
also impeach Mrs. Joy's statement to the police that she had never allowed Mr. Joy to insert a 
dildo into her anus. 
When the State filed a motion to quash Mr. Joy's subpoena duces tecum, rather than 
evaluate that motion (and a subsequent motion for reconsideration) under the standard set forth 
in I.C.R. 17(b) (the rule concerning subpoenas duces tecum and the quashing of such subpoenas), 
the district court sought to determine whether the evidence on the computer was admissible at 
trial and, concluding that it was not, granted the State's motion. Consequently, the computer was 
never turned over to Mr. Joy and his counsel, and the exculpatory evidence was never disclosed. 
For the reasons set forth fully below, Mr. Joy contends that the district court erred in 
quashing his subpoena duces tecum. Specifically, he contends that the district court erred in 
failing to engage in the appropriate analysis under I.C.R. 17(b) and that, under the appropriate 
Rule 17(b) analysis, it was error to quash the subpoena. 
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B. Applicable Legal Standards 
Under the Idaho Rules of Criminal Procedure, a district court may grant a motion to 
quash a subpoena "if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive." I.C.R. 17(b). The 
standard for appellate review of a district court's decision under I.C.R. 17 (b) is not entirely clear, 
see State v. Salsbury, 129 Idaho 307, 308 (1996) (pointing out that findings of fact are reviewed 
for clear error and that issues of law are reviewed de nova, but failing to address the standard of 
review for the ultimate issue of whether the lower court erred); however, the standard of Rule 
17(b) ("unreasonable and oppressive") is one that seems to call for an exercise of the district 
court's discretion and, therefore, any decision under Rule 17(b) will likely be reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion. 
C. Specific Facts Related To This Claim 
Well in advance of his scheduled trial date, Mr. Joy apparently obtained a subpoena 
duces tecwn commanding his wife to produce the couple's computer for inspection. (See R., 
p.103.) Mr. Joy, who was at that time incarcerated and, besides, was precluded from returning to 
his home because of a no-contact order (see R., p.26 (original order setting bond), p.27 (no-
contact order), p.48 (order increasing bond), p.65 (order refusing to lower bond)), sought access 
to their computer based on his belief that it contained exculpatory evidence-stil 1 photos and 
movies of the Joys engaged in consensual sex involving bondage (which would explain the 
ligature marks on Mrs. Joy's ankles and wrists on the night that Mr. Joy was alleged to have 
committed the crimes at issue in this case) and the insertion of a dildo into Mrs. Joy's anus 
(which would not only tend to show that any such activity on the night in question was 
consensual, but would also impeach Mrs. Joy's statement to the police that she had never 
allowed Mr. Joy to insert a dildo into her anus). (See R., pp.124-28.Tr., p.82, Ls.1-16, p.91, L.6 
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p.93, L.14.) Mr. Joy also filed with the district court a "Motion to Release Property,'' seeking the 
same end. (R., p.101.) 
Approximately a month later, the State filed a motion requesting an order quashing the 
subpoena duces tecum. (R., p.103.) Although no basis to quash the subpoena was articulated in 
the motion itself (see R., p.l 03), the State argued at a November 30, 2009 hearing that it should 
be quashed because sexually explicit photos of Mrs. Joy would be irrelevant and, further, 
inadmissible under I.R.E. 412 because the defense had not filed a "written offer of proof ... 
outlining what they want to use and the reason they want to use it ... "25 (Tr., p.81, Ls.11-24, 
p.82, L.18 - p.83, L.11, p.90, L.21 - p.91, L.4, p.93, L.16 - p.94, L.1). 
The district court granted the State's motion. (Tr., p.94, Ls.2-24; R., p.122.) In doing so, 
it explicitly declined to evaluate the State's motion under the standard for quashing subpoenas 
that is set forth in I.C.R. 17(b) (Tr., p.94, Ls.18-21); instead, it ruled that, because the defense 
had not yet complied with I.R.E. 412, any evidence discovered on the computer was inadmissible 
and, therefore, the defense was not entitled to discovery of that evidence (Tr., p.94, Ls.2-21).26 
A few days later, Mr. Joy filed a motion for reconsideration and a supporting 
memorandum. (See R., pp.144-45, 146-50.) Citing I.R.E. 412(b)(2)(B),27 and his Sixth and 
25 Under Rule 412, if a defendant in a sex crime case seeks to introduce evidence of the past 
sexual behavior of the alleged victim, he must make a motion and submit an offer of proof in 
advance of trial. I.R.E. 412(c). 
26 As far as the district court knew at the time, the evidence in question was still fully intact. (As 
is discussed above, at the November 30, 2011 hearing, Mrs. Joy spoke of the evidence in 
question in the present tense. (See note 10, supra.)) Thus, the district court admonished Mrs. Joy 
not "to tamper with that computer in any way, shape or form .... " (Tr., p.94, Ls.17-18.) 
However, unbeknownst to the district court, Mrs. Joy already attempted to destroy the 
exculpatory evidence. (See PSI Add., pp.9-10 (police report concerning a partial forensic 
examination of the computer, revealing that the files in question were deleted on October 17, 
2009).) Of course, as is so often the case, at least some of that evidence was still recoverable 
months later and, in fact, was recovered by the State. (See PSI Add., pp.9-10.) 
27 Under Rule 412(b )(2)(B), evidence of the alleged victim's past sexual behavior may be 
admitted if it consists of evidence of "past sexual behavior with the accused and is offered by the 
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Fourteenth Amendment right to present a defense, Mr. Joy argued that the images in question 
were, in fact, relevant and admissible. (R., pp.146-50.) 
Another hearing was held on December 10, 2009. (See generally R., pp.152-56.) At this 
hearing, the State continued to argue that the evidence in question was simply not relevant. (Tr., 
p.112, L.23 - p.114, L.2.) Specifically, the State argued that "[w]hether or not they've had 
bondage issues in the past, whether or not they've used this particular device in the past doesn't 
have anything to do with this case and whether or not force was used, and so I think beyond the 
412 issues is a relevance issue .... " (Tr., p.113, L.22 - p.114, L.2.) In addition, the State argued 
that because Mrs. Joy could never be questioned regarding her prior sexual behavior, the images 
on the computer could never be used to impeach her (false) statement to the police that she had 
never consented to this type of activity before. (Tr., p.113, Ls.1-21.) Ultimately, the district court 
concluded that, the notice requirement of Rule 412 had been complied with, but it denied "the 
412 motion to the extent there is a 412 motion" because it was not "convinced that either of the 
desired photograph categories are relevant to this case." (Tr., p.122, L.17 - p.123, L.3.) The 
district court then went on to rule that because the contents of the Joys' computer could become 
relevant based on the trial testimony and, therefore, directed the State "to have this computer 
handy" at that time. (Tr., p.123, Ls.3-7, p.124, Ls.13-15.) 
Later, when it was learned that Mrs. Joy had deleted the photographs and movies on the 
computer, this issue was brought to the fore again by defense counsel requesting both a 
continuance of the trial, as well as defense access to the computer so that it could attempt to 
recover any deleted files. (See Tr., p.130, Ls.8-13.) This time, the district court recognized that 
the images in question could be relevant, so it ordered Mrs. Joy to turn the computer over to the 
accused upon the issue of whether the alleged victim consented to the sexual behavior with 
respect to which the sex crime is alleged .... " I.R.E. 412(b)(2)(B). 
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State to determine what data could be recovered. (R., pp.168-70, 171; Tr., p.132, L.14 p.134, 
L.12.) It refused, however, to continue the trial or order the computer or its contents disclosed to 
the defense (unless the State was unwilling or unable to forensically examine the computer). (R., 
pp.168-70; Tr.,p.132, L.14 p.134, L.12.) 
Finally, after the State had conducted a preliminary forensic examination of the computer 
uncovering images of Mrs. Joy engaged in various sex acts, including use of a dildo, but not 
uncovering any images of Mrs. Joy engaged in sexual bondage (see Tr., p.141, Ls.9-13, p.143, 
Ls.9-22),28 the district court, again recognizing that the images on the computer might be 
relevant and admissible, continued the trial so that the State could complete its forensic 
examination. (Tr., p.150, Ls.5-20.) Unfortunately, however, the State never revealed on the 
record whether it actually completed its forensic examination and, if it did, what (if anything) 
was found and whether those findings were ever conveyed to the defense. 
D. The District Court Erred In Quashing Mr. Joy's Subpoena Duces Tecum 
The district court erred in two respects when it granted the State's motion to quash the 
subpoena (and, later, denied Mr. Joy's motion to reconsider). Most fundamentally, it abused its 
discretion when, although it was confronted with the correct standard for evaluating motions to 
quash subpoenas under Rule 17(b) (see Tr., p.81, Ls.11-13), it declined to apply that standard 
28 As noted above (see note 11, supra), the prosecutor presented a very misleading picture of 
what had been discovered in the forensic examination of the computer. The prosecutor led the 
district court and defense counsel to believe that there were no images of Mrs. Joy engaged in 
consensual sexual activity with Mr. Joy on the computer, and that any images involving a dildo 
involved one other than the purple dildo that was allegedly used in this case (see Tr., p.141, Ls.9-
13, p.143, L.9 - p.145, L.l; see also Tr., p.145, L.2 - p.147, L.25 (prosecutor failing to correct 
the district court's misapprehensions when the district court stated its understanding of the 
prosecutor's offer of proof concerning the images found by Detective Stewart); however, 
Detective Steven Stewart, the expert who conducted the forensic examination of the Joys' 
computer, wrote in his report that he had told the prosecutor that he found several "video files of 
Preston and Jennifer [Joy] during sexual activity," and that one of these videos depicted Mrs. Joy 
"using a green and orange dildo anally, while Preston applied a dark colored dildo [which he 
thought was purple] to Jennifer's vagina." (PSI Add., p.10.) 
35 
(see Tr., p.94, Ls.20-21 ), opting, instead, to quash the subpoena based on standards of 
admissibility (see Tr., p.94, Ls.2-21 (original order quashing subpoena), p.122, L.17 p.123, L.3 
(denial of motion for reconsideration)). This application of the wrong legal standard constituted 
error. See State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471 (2010) (finding error in the district court's failure to 
evaluate the admissibility of evidence under the correct standard); State v. lvfeister, 148 Idaho 
236, 241 (2009) (same). 
Furthermore, under the correct standard, the subpoena should not have been quashed. As 
noted, the Idaho Criminal Rules provide that a district court may only quash a subpoena "if 
compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive." LC.R. 17(b ). In this case, no showing of 
unreasonableness or oppressiveness was made. 
Initially, compliance with the subpoena would have been reasonable because its contents 
appeared to have been relevant to Mr. Joy's case. Although the contents of the computer cannot 
be determined with any certainty (precisely because the district court quashed the subpoena), 
there is ample reason to believe that the Joys' computer contained evidence that was both 
relevant and exculpatory: still photos and/or movies depicting the Joys engaged in consensual 
sex involving bondage, as well as the insertion of a dildo into Mrs. Joy's anus. (See R., p.149 
(Mr. Joy's memorandum in support of motion to reconsideration, implicitly asserting that the 
computer contained images of Mrs. Joy "using a dildo that matches the description of the dildo 
that she alleges was used against her," and "allow[ing] herself to be 'tied up' during sexual acts); 
Tr., p.81, Ls.15-18 (prosecutor stating his "understanding that that computer has some photos of 
Mrs. Joy, sexually explicit photos of Mrs. Joy taken by the defendant three or four years ago), 
p.87, L.17 p.88, L.6 (Mrs. Joy testifying (as part of the State's ofier ofproot) that the computer 
contained sexually explicit photos), p.91, L.6 - p.92, L.9 (defense counsel acknowledging that 
she could not know for sure what was on the computer, but stating her "understanding" and 
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"belief," based presumably on her discussions with Mr. Joy, that the computer contained images 
of Mrs. Joy using a sex toy and engaging in consensual sexual bondage), p.110, Ls.3-6 (defense 
counsel stating "[w]e believe that there's evidence that will ... show she consented to acts, these 
kind of similar acts that she's alleging that she did not consent to"), p.116, Ls.19-24 (defense 
counsel reiterating her understanding that the computer contained images of consensual sexual 
bondage), p.118, Ls.5-7 (defense counsel stating her belief that the computer contained images 
of Mrs. Joy engaging in consensual anal penetration with a dildo), p.120, L. 7 - p.122, L.16 
(defense counsel again making clear that, although she could not answer specific questions 
because she had never seen the images in question, her belief was that the computer would 
contain images of sexual bondage and anal penetration with a dildo), p.132, L.23 - p.133, L.13 
(assuming, without explicitly deciding, that the computer contained images of Mrs. Joy using the 
dildo anally consensually and engaging in sexual bondage), p.139, Ls.3-6 (defense counsel 
reiterating belief that the computer contains images of Mrs. Joy consensually engaging in "anal 
sex activity with" her husband), p.140, L.24 - p.143, L.22 (prosecutor representing that Mrs. Joy 
told him that the computer would contain images of her using a dildo but would not contain 
images of sexual bondage, and further representing that a preliminary forensic examination was 
thus far consistent with Mrs. Joy's statements to the prosecutor), p.135, Ls.15-24 (defense 
counsel again stating her understanding that the computer would contain images of Mr. and Mrs. 
Joy using the purple dildo in question anally); PSI Add., pp.9-10 (Detective Stewart's report 
regarding his preliminary forensic examination of the computer, indicating he had not seen any 
images of sexual bondage, but that he did view a video depicting a consensual encounter in 
which Mr. Joy inserted the purple dildo into his wife's vagina and she inserted a second dildo 
into her own anus). As noted above, the images depicting the Joys engaged in consensual sex 
involving bondage was relevant to explain the ligature marks on Mrs. Joy's ankles and wrists and 
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corroborated Mr. Joy's contention that those marks were the result of consensual sexual activity, 
not any sort of abuse. Furthermore, the images depicting the insertion of a dildo into Mrs. Joy's 
anus would have been relevant to show that any such activity on the night in question was 
consensual, and it was relevant to impeach Mrs. Joy's statement to the police that she had never 
allowed Mr. Joy to insert a dildo into her anus). (See R., pp.124-28; Tr., p.82, Ls.l-16, p.91, L.6 
-p.93, L.14.) 
Furthermore, there is no viable argument that anything about the nature of the material 
requested rendered the subpoena unreasonable or oppressive. First, as a practical concern, 
compliance with the subpoena would have been a relatively simple matter for Mrs. Joy. This is 
not a situation in which the subpoena would have called for her to expend a great deal of time, 
effort, or money sifting through a large number of documents or electronic files, or compiling 
information from distant sites or a multitude of different sources; it would have called for her to 
tum over a single item which was easily transported. Moreover, insofar as Mrs. Joy was 
concerned about not having the family's home computer or its data available to her for the entire 
length of the case, mirror images of the hard drive were relatively simple to produce (see PSI 
Add., pp.9-10), so she probably could have had her computer, or at least a copy of its data, 
returned to her relatively quickly. 
Second, the item sought was not even Mrs. Joy's exclusive property. Although the 
computer was in Mrs. Joy's custody when Mr. Joy was incarcerated, that computer, quite clearly, 
was jointly owned by him and his wife. Mrs. Joy testified that the computer was purchased well 
after she and Mr. Joy were married (Tr., p.85, Ls.15-18, p.88, Ls.11-15), and that both she and 
Mr. Joy knew the password to log onto the computer and used it regularly (Tr., p.86, L.17 p.87, 
L.8, p.88, L.25 - p.89, L.18). 
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Third, Mrs. Joy's potential embarrassment over the contents of the computer did not 
justify its suppression.29 The computer and/or its contents could have very easily been ordered 
sealed (a solution that defense counsel suggested numerous times (see, e.g., Tr., p.91, Ls.13-17 
(request made at hearing of Nov. 30, 2009), p.110, Ls.10-14 (request made at hearing of Dec. 10, 
2009), p.118, Ls.7-12 (same), p.130, Ls.21-25 (request made at hearing of Dec. 11, 2009))). 
Under that scenario, unless the images were actually admitted at trial, the only individuals who 
would need to view those images would be the judge, the prosecutor, the defense attorney, and 
Mr. Joy, and, of course, those images would not depict anything Mr. Joy had not seen before. 
Because the embarrassment attendant to disclosing the sexually explicit images to three trained 
professionals (the judge, the prosecutor, and the defense attorney) who, much like doctors, have 
"seen it all before," is minimal--especially when considered in light of the fact that the 
defendant has already been humiliated much more publicly through the allegations against him, 
and especially when balanced against the defendant's interest in obtaining relevant exculpatory 
evidence-that embarrassment cannot support a conclusion that the subpoena in this case was 
unreasonable or oppressive. 
In conclusion, it is apparent that the district court acted outside the bounds of its 
discretion by applying the wrong legal standard but, even had the district court engaged in the 
proper analysis under Rule l 7(b), it would have abused its discretion in quashing the subpoena 
29 Although there is certainly evidence that Mrs. Joy was embarrassed by the images at issue in 
this case (see Tr., p.87, L.20 p.88, L.4 (testifying that she was embarrassed because "there's 
pictures of me posing, pictures of him having sex with me"); see also Tr., p.129, L.23 p.131, 
L.15 (discussing the fact that Mrs. Joy had deleted the images, but not making it clear whether 
she did so out of embarrassment or in an attempt to destroy evidence favorable to her husband)), 
and the reality is that just about anyone would feel some embarrassment over the dissemination 
of such images, it is reasonable to infer that Mrs. Joy's level of embarrassment was relatively 
mild. After all, Mrs. Joy not only allowed her husband to record these images, but she also 
apparently consented to the distribution of some of them on the internet. (See Tr., p.143, L.22 -
p.145, L.1.) 
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because there was no showing that compliance with the subpoena would have been unreasonable 
or oppressive. 
III. 
The District Court Erred In A Number Oflts Mid-Trial Evidentiary Rulings 
During the course of Mr. Joy's trial, the district court was asked to make myriad 
evidentiary rulings. Mr. Joy contends that in at least seven instances, the district court erred in its 
rulings. First, it erred in allowing Mrs. Joy to read a large portion of her preliminary hearing 
testimony into the record. Second, it erred in allowing one of the detectives to recite numerous 
out-of-court statements made by Mrs. Joy in her interview with the police. Third, it erred in 
precluding Mr. Joy repeating one of his out-of-court statements made to the police. Fourth, it 
erred in admitting an exhibit for which an inadequate foundation had been laid. Fifth, it erred in 
allowing the prosecutor to elicit irrelevant, highly prejudicial evidence, which went beyond the 
scope of direct examination, in cross-examining Mr. Joy. Sixth, it erred in allowing the 
prosecutor to question Mr. Joy regarding another witness's beliefs. And seventh, it erred in 
allowing the prosecutor to badger Mr. Joy during cross-examination. 
A. The District Court Erred In Allowing Mrs. Joy To Read A Large Portion Of Her 
Preliminary Hearing Testimony Into The Record At Trial 
As the prosecutor had predicted (see Tr., p.147, Ls.1-17), at Mr. Joy's trial, Mrs. Joy was 
impeached "six ways from Sunday" based on certain inconsistencies between her statements to 
the police and her subsequent testimony. (See ns.2-5, supra (highlighting these inconsistencies).) 
However, most of these inconsistencies were not brought out until Detective Ellis took the 
witness stand (after Mrs. Joy's testimony had concluded) because Mrs. Joy denied having any 
recollection of 'most of her previous inconsistent statements. (See, e.g., Tr., p.396, Ls.4-17 
(denying any memory of her statement to Det. Ellis about whether she was undressed before or 
after she went into the tub), p.401, Ls.8-10 (denying any memory of her statement to Det. Ellis 
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that she didn't consider what had allegedly been done to her to be "rape"), p.402, Ls. 7-17 
(denying any memory of having told Det. Ellis that she had gotten a hand free), p.404, L.23 -
p.405, L. l (denying any memory of having told Det. Ellis that she had a robe on when she went 
out to her husband's truck).) Thus, during cross-examination, Mrs. Joy was only actually 
impeached with her own prior statements on three topics. First, she was impeached with her 
inconsistent preliminary hearing testimony concerning whether the tub was full or empty when 
she was supposedly tied up. (See Tr., p.397, L.6 - p.399, L.4.) Second, she was impeached with 
her inconsistent statement to the police concerning whether the dildo was used in her vagina 
versus her anus. (Tr., p.400, L.21 - p.401, L.7, p.401, Ls.11-17.) Third, she was impeached with 
her concededly false statement to the police that she had never allowed her anus to be penetrated 
before. (Tr., p.401, Ls.18-25.) Notably though, Mrs. Joy was impeached more generally with 
evidence suggesting that she had various motives to falsely implicate her husband. (See, e.g., Tr., 
p.278, Ls.15-23 (discussing Mrs. Joy's jealousy based on her suspicion that her husband had a 
girlfriend on the side), p.382, Ls.11-24 (discussing the fact that Mrs. Joy had filed for divorce 
and, in the divorce, hoped to obtain two cars and the couples' house, land, and furniture), p.391, 
L.23 - p.392, L.18 (repeatedly asking about Mrs. Joy's drinking and anger on the evening of July 
28, 2009, thereby raising the inference that she was drunk and, in fact, was the aggressor in this 
incident).) 
Although defense counsel's cross-examination of Mrs. Joy had revealed only three 
inconsistent (or admittedly false) prior statements, on redirect, the State sought to have Mrs. Joy 
read a large portion of her preliminary hearing transcript--covering matters generally well 
outside the scope of those for which she had made prior inconsistent statements or admittedly 
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false statements-into the trial record.30 (See Tr., p.411, L.3 - p.416, L.8.) Defense counsel 
objected to Mrs. Joy reading her preliminary hearing testimony into the record, in part, because it 
is not "proper rehabilitation to go over testimony" on a topic for which the defense had offered 
no "inconsistent" evidence or testimony. (Tr., p.411, Ls.12-15.) In response, the prosecutor 
argued that Mrs. Joy should be allowed to read her preliminary hearing testimony into the record 
because "it's a prior consistent statement under oath, and it should be allowed at this point, 
especially since the defense spent some time on cross-examination on this particular hearing." 
(Tr., p.411, Ls.17-20.) The district court then overruled the defense objection without 
explanation. (Tr., p.411, L.21.) 
On appeal, Mr. Joy contends that the district court's ruling was in error because the vast 
majority the preliminary hearing testimony read into the trial record31 was inadmissible hearsay. 
The Idaho Rules of Evidence provide that an out of court statement, offered for the truth of the 
matter asserted therein, is generally considered hearsay, and that hearsay is generally 
inadmissible. I.R.E. 801 ( c ), 802. Mr. Joy contends that these general principles apply in this 
case. Obviously, Mrs. Joy's prior testimony constitutes a series of out-of-court statements. 
Further, there can be little doubt that that prior testimony was offered to prove the truth of the 
statements contained. 
30 The only portion(s) of the preliminary hearing read into the trial record which addressed a 
topic which she had been impeached in cross-examination was/were a brief exchange concerning 
when she was supposedly tied up in relation to when the water was let out of the tub (Tr., p.414, 
Ls.2-9) and, arguably, a brief exchange concerning when she was undressed (Tr., p.413, Ls.21-
24), although to say that the latter exchange was relevant to something Mrs. Joy had been 
impeached on would require this Court to say that defense counsel merely asking a question 
(which the witness claimed not to be able to answer based on an inadequate memory) was 
sufficient to constitute impeachment. Otherwise, the portions of preliminary hearing testimony 
read into the record had no relation to anything that was challenged on cross-examination. (See 
Tr., p.412, L.7 -p.416, L.8 (reading preliminary hearing testimony concerning Mr. Joy allegedly 
dunking her head under water, gagging her with a towel, and binding her hands and feet.) 
31 Lest there be any confusion, Mr. Joy asserts that all of Mrs. Joy's testimony appearing at page 
412, line 7, through page 414, line 1, and page 414, line 10, through page 416, line 8. 
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Nevertheless, below, the State implicitly argued, and the district court presumably found, 
that Mrs. Joy's preliminary hearing testimony was non-hearsay under LR.E. 801 (d)(l )(B). That 
Rule provides that where an out-of-court statement is "consistent with declarant's [trial] 
testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against declarant of recent 
fabrication or improper influence or motive," that statement is not considered hearsay. I.RE. 
80 I (d)(l)(B). However, Mr. Joy contends that this subpart of Rule 801 is inapplicable because 
there was no "express or implied charge against declarant [Mrs. Joy] of recent fabrication or 
improper influence or motive." 
Preliminarily, as noted, the bulk of the out-of-court statements read into the record did 
not concern any statements that had been impeached on cross-examination. Thus, there was no 
express or implied charge that Mrs. Joy changed any specific details of her story prior to trial. 32 
Furthermore, although defense counsel's cross-examination of Mrs. Joy certainly raised 
the inference that her entire story was fabricated, this was insufficient to justify admission of any 
prior out-of-court statement that happened to be consistent with her trial testimony. Mr. Joy 
submits that only prior consistent statements which pre-date the declarant 's motive to testifY 
falsely at trial fall within the ambit of Rule 80l(d)(l)(B). This appears to be the clear majority 
rule among jurisdictions having analogues to Idaho Rule of Evidence 801. United States v. Piva, 
870 F.2d 753, 759 n.4 (1st Cir. 1989) (observing that "[t]he majority view [among federal circuit 
courts of appeals] is that statements made after the declarant had acquired a motive to lie are not 
substantively admissible as prior consistent statements," and compiling cases)33 ; State v. 
32 The one exception would be the portion Mrs. Joy's the preliminary hearing testimony wherein 
she testified about when she was supposedly tied up in relation to when the water was let out of 
the tub. (See Tr., p.414, Ls.2-9.) Mr. Joy concedes that that single piece of evidence was properly 
admitted as a prior consistent statement under Rule 801 ( d)(l )(B ). 
33 Among the circuits adhering to this rule is the Ninth Circuit. See, e.g., United States v. Roher, 
708 F.2d 429, 433-34 (9th Cir. 1983) ("A prior consistent statement is admissible to rehabilitate a 
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Damiano, 587 A.2d 396, 401 (R.I. 1991) (recognizing the majority rule in the federal courts, 
observing that "[t]his majority view adopted by federal courts has also been recognized by the 
majority of state courts whose jurisdictions have adopted rules of evidence modeled upon the 
Federal Rules," and finding the majority rule persuasive and adopting it for the State of Rhode 
Island). Further, it appears to be the rule in Idaho as well. See State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 
894-95 (1999) (finding error in the admission of an out-of-court statement, offered as a "prior 
consistent statement" of a witness, was error because the out-of-court statement was not actually 
consistent with anything the witness testified to at trial; couching the applicable standard as 
being whether "the statement can[ ] be construed as a prior consistent statement which preceded 
any motive ... to lie" (emphasis added)). See also State v. Howell, 137 Idaho 817, 820 (Ct.App. 
2002) ("[T]he district court concluded that the evidence was improperly admitted because that 
evidentiary rule permits the use of a prior consistent statement to rebut a claim of recent 
fabrication only if the statement preceded the alleged motive to fabricate. The State has explicitly 
declined to challenge this aspect of the trial court's ruling, and for purposes of this appeal we will 
assume the validity of this interpretation of Rule 80l(d)(l)(B)."); State v. A1cAway, 127 Idaho 
54, 58-59 (1995) (holding that where trial was held three years after victim first disclosed crime, 
and defendant sought to impeach victim's testimony by suggesting that that testimony had been 
coached over the previous three years, court held that videotape, made shortly after initial 
disclosure by victim, was admissible as a prior consistent statement under LR.E. 80l(d)(l)(B)). 
In this case, because Mrs. Joy's motive to lie arose prior to her giving testimony at her husband's 
preliminary hearing (and, in fact, prior to her calling the police in the early morning hours of July 
witness only if made before the witness has a motive to fabricate. . . . [T]he diagram was 
inadmissible because it did not precede his motive to fabricate."). 
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29, 2009), use of the preliminary hearing testimony was not an appropriate mechanism to attempt 
to rebut any sort of charge of "recent fabrication or improper influence or motive." 
In light of the foregoing, it was error for the district court to have allowed Mrs. Joy to 
read significant portions of her preliminary hearing testimony into the record at Mr. Joy's trial. 
B. The District Court Erred In Allowing Detective March To Recite Numerous Out-Of-
Court Statements Made By Mrs. Joy To The Police 
As noted above (see Part III(A), supra; ns.2-5, supra), Mrs. Joy was impeached--on 
cross-examination and through the testimony of Detective Ellis--with certain inconsistencies 
between her trial testimony and her prior statements (to the police originally and at the 
preliminary hearing), and the defense revealed certain motives that she had to lie generally. In 
response, not only did the State have her read a large portion of her preliminary hearing 
testimony into the trial record (see Part III(A), supra), but it also had Detective March, a 
detective who interviewed Mrs. Joy a few days after the July 28-29, 2009 incident, give an 
extensive recitation of the statements made by Mrs. Joy to him. (See Tr., p.455, L.6 - p.461, 
L. 7.) Just as was the case with the preliminary hearing testimony read into the trial record (see 
Part III(A), supra), the out-of-court statements testified to by Detective March concerned much 
more than the few specific matters which Mrs. Joy had been impeached on. (See Tr., p.455, L.6 -
p.461, L.7 (reciting Mrs. Joy's statements about, inter alia, what she and Mr. Joy had been 
arguing about, how she wound up in the bath tub, her head being dunked under water, the gag 
being placed in her mouth, the details of her having been hogtied, kicks delivered in Mr. Joy's 
truck, the drive around the Joys' property, Mr. Joy's death threats, and her efforts to de-escalate 
the situation and call the police).) 
Again, defense counsel objected to the State's our-of-court statements on "hearsay" 
grounds. (Tr., p.455, L.14.) Once more though, the State argued that the out-of-court statements 
were admissible pursuant to I.R.E. 801(d)(l)(B): "I think it's prior consistent statements in light 
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of the cross-examination of Deputy Ellis." (Tr., p.455, Ls.16-18.) And once again, the district 
court overruled defense counsel's objection with no explanation. (Tr., p.455, Ls.21-22.) 
On appeal, Mr. Joy contends that the district court's ruling was in error because the vast 
majority the out-of-court statements testified to by Detective March34 constituted inadmissible 
hearsay under I.R.E. 801. Just as is the case with the preliminary hearing testimony read into the 
record by Mrs. Joy, the out-of-court statements testified to by Detective March are generally 
unrelated to the topics on which Mrs. Joy had specifically been impeached. Accordingly, those 
statements were not "offered to rebut an express or implied charge ... of recent fabrication or 
improper influence or motive" within the meaning of I.R.E. 80l(d)(l)(B). Furthermore, because 
Mrs. Joy's motive to lie arose before she made the prior consistent statements testified to by 
Detective Marsh, and for the reasons explained fully in Part III(A), supra, Rule 80l(d)(l)(B) 
does not apply to those statements. 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Joy submits that the bulk of the out-of-court statements 
testified to by Detective March were hearsay and, therefore, were improperly admitted by the 
district court. 
34 Mr. Joy contends that, with regard to the out-of-court statements testified to by Detective 
March, those that were improperly were those that concerned: what Mr. and Mrs. Joy had been 
arguing about and how Mrs. Joy wound up in the bath tub (Tr., p.455, L.11 - p.456, L.6, p.457, 
L.22 - p.458, L.5, p.458, Ls.20-21); Mrs. Joy's head being dunked under water and the gag 
being placed in her mouth (Tr., p.458, Ls.10-17, 21-22); the details of Mrs. Joy having been 
hogtied (Tr., p.458, L.23 - p.459, L.4); the details of what happened while Mrs. Joy was driven 
around the Joys' property in Mr. Joy's pickup, including kicks delivered, discussions had, and 
threats made (Tr., p.460, Ls.10-20); and Mrs. Joy's efforts to de-escalate the situation, return 
home, and call the police (Tr., p.460, L.21 - p.461, L.7). Mr. Joy concedes, however, that certain 
out-of-court statements testified to by Detective March were properly admitted, namely, those 
addressing whether Mrs. Joy was clothed when she went into the tub (Tr., p.458, Ls.6-11), those 
discussing the robe that Mrs. Joy did or did not wear while going to Mr. Joy's truck (Tr., p.459, 
Ls.4-5, p.460, Ls3-9), and those addressing the questions of whether the dildo penetrated Mrs. 
Joy's anus or her vagina on the night in question and whether she had consented to such things 
previously (Tr., p.459, Ls.6-15). 
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C. The District Court Erred In Refusing To Allow Mr. Joy To Be Rehabilitated With A Prior 
Consistent Statement 
While testifying in his defense, Mr. Joy was cross-examined on whether, since it was his 
contention that Mrs. Joy was the aggressor during the July 3-4, 2009 and July 19, 2009 "prior 
bad act" incidents, he had called the police to report his wife's crimes; in both instances Mr. Joy 
conceded he had not called the police. (See Tr., p.592, Ls.8-18, p.595, Ls.12-13.) Mr. Joy further 
testified that the reason he never called the police during any of the incidents where his wife was 
physical with him was that he did not want to get his wife in trouble. (Tr., p.592, Ls.19-24, 
p.649, L.24 - p.650.) 
Immediately after Mr. Joy testified on redirect that he did not tum his wife in because he 
did not want to get her in trouble, defense counsel asked the following question: "And that's 
what you told Deputy Ellis when you were getting arrested on July 29th7,, (Tr., p.650, Ls.3-4.) 
Obviously, the intent was to bolster Mr. Joy's credibility by showing that he had made a prior 
consistent statement to the police. However, the prosecutor interposed a "leading" objection, 
which was (correctly) sustained. (Tr., p.650, Ls.5-6.) Thereafter, defense counsel rephrased her 
question as follows: "What did you tell Deputy Ellis when you were getting arrested on July 
29th?" (Tr., p.650, Ls.7-8.) This time, the prosecutor objected on "hearsay" grounds. (Tr., p.650, 
L.9.) In response, defense counsel argued that the statement was admissible because, inter alia, 
"it's his own statement." (Tr., p.650, Ls.11-13.) However, the district court sustained the State's 
objection, thus prohibiting the defense from offering Mr. Joy's prior consistent statement. (See 
Tr., p.650, L.18.) 
On appeal, Mr. Joy contends that, to the extent that pnor consistent out-of-court 
statements are admissible under I.RE. 80l(d)(l)(B) to rehabilitate witnesses generally, i.e., even 
where the proffered statements do not address a topic that was specifically impeached by the 
opposing party, the district court erred in prohibiting Mr. Joy from offering such a statement in 
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this case. In other words, if the district court was correct to have allowed the State to offer prior 
consistent statements of Mrs. Joy in order to enhance her credibility generally (see Parts III(A) & 
(B), supra), then he contends that it erred in precluding Mr. Joy from doing the same.35 
Although Mr. Joy's contention that he did not call the police because he did not want to 
get his wife in trouble was not specifically challenged by the State on cross-examination, the 
State did attempt to tarnish his credibility generally, thus suggesting that he was lying about 
everything he said. (See, e.g., Tr., p.578, Ls.1-5 (eliciting testimony to the effect that, although 
Mr. Joy testified at trial, that he was injured by his wife on the night of July 28, 29, 2009, when 
the police arrived in the early morning hours of the 29r\ he falsely told them that he was not 
injured).) In order to rebut this "express or implied charge ... of recent fabrication or improper 
influence or motive," he should have been granted an opportunity to offer his prior consistent 
statement. See I.R.E. 801 ( d)( 1 )(B ). 
D. The District Court Erred In Admitting State's Exhibit 46 (A Boot Lace) 
Mrs. Joy claims that, during the incident of July 28-29, 2009, her husband hogtied her 
with a boot lace. At her husband's preliminary hearing, Mrs. Joy testified that the boot lace in 
question was "a brown leather shoelace-bootlace." (Prelim. Tr., p.36, Ls.20-22 (emphasis 
added); accord Prelim Tr., p.12, Ls.9-11.) At her husband's trial, she again testified that the boot 
lace (or laces) in question was/were made out of leather. (Tr., p.409, Ls.17-18; accord Tr., p.472, 
Ls.11-13.) However, when the police arrived at the Joy home in the early morning hours of July 
29, 2009, they did not locate any leather boot laces; in fact, they did not find any boot laces at all. 
(See Tr., p.428, L.15 - p.429, L.12 (Det. Ellis testifying that she attempted to verify Mrs. Joy's 
35 Mr. Joy is not unmindful of the fact that the argument present in this subsection of his 
Appellant's Brief is somewhat inconsistent with the argument that is presented in the preceding 
subsections. Thus, the present argument is presented as an alternative to that which is presented 
in Parts III(A) & (B) above. Mr. Joy concedes that if he prevails as to those arguments, he should 
probably lose this one; and if he loses those arguments on the merits, he should win this one. 
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version of events by searching the Joys' residence and Mr. Joy's truck, identifying the items 
observed which she believed corroborated Mrs. Joy's story, and making no mention of having 
observed any boot laces).)36 Nevertheless, Mrs. Joy's sister-in-law, Tami Wiitala, found a boot 
lace in Mr. Joy's nightstand, which she and/or Mrs. Joy turned over to the police a few days 
later. (Tr., p.238, Ls.5-19, p.461, L.8 - p.462, L.11, p.469, Ls.9-22.) With regard to that boot lace 
(identified as Exhibit 46 at trial), Mrs. Joy testified as follows: 
Q. And then what about Number 46? 
A. That's the shoelace or the boot lace that I'm pretty sure it was exactly 
like this one. I'm pretty sure that's the one he used. My sister-in-law found it. 
Q. And that is the same one you gave to Detective March? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are you exactly sure it's the same one? 
A. I'm not exactly sure if it's the same one, but I know that's the exact 
same kind he used. 
(Tr., p.469, Ls.9-18.) Interestingly though, the boot lace that was entered into evidence was not 
leather; Detective March testified that it appeared to be made of nylon.37 (Tr., p.476, L.19 -
p.477, L.I; see also Ex. 46.38) 
36 Although it was not brought out at trial, Detective Ellis' report indicates that she specifically 
looked for the boot or shoe laces, but could find none: "I attempted to locate the brown shoelaces 
Jennifer said she was tied up with, but was unable to locate them. Jennifer said she thought she 
had placed them in her purse, which I located in the closet however the laces were not in it." (PSI 
Add., p.3.) 
37 Belatedly, the prosecutor elicited testimony from Mrs. Joy to the effect that she does not 
actually know what leather is and, therefore, she believed that the nylon boot lace marked as 
Exhibit 46 was, in fact, a leather boot lace. (See Tr., p.472, L.18 -p.473, L.1.) \Vhile this was an 
admirable attempt to protect the State's interest in obtaining a conviction, Mr. Joy submits that it 
is a wholly non-credible explanation of the clear inconsistency between Mrs. Joy's testimony and 
the physical evidence. After all, Mrs. Joy was at that time a 45 year old woman (PSI, p.8) who 
had raised three children to adulthood (Tr., p.257, Ls.11-21) and had been employed "in the 
credit department, accounts receivable" of a boat trailer business for the previous ten years (Tr., 
fi.257, L.22 p.258, L.9). Surely, she knows what leather is. 
8 The best evidence of the construction of the boot lace marked as Exhibit 46 is Exhibit 46 itself. 
However, that exhibit was not provided to this Court as part of the Record on Appeal. 
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When the State moved for admission of Exhibit 46, the nylon boot lace, defense counsel 
objected on the basis of "foundation." (See Tr., p.469, L.23 - p.470, L.13.) That objection, 
however, was overruled, and Exhibit 46 was admitted. (Tr., p.470, Ls.14-16.) On appeal, Mr. Joy 
contends that it was error for the district court to have admitted Exhibit 46. 
The Idaho Rules of Evidence provide that "[t]he requirement of authentication or 
identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to 
support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims." I.RE. 90l(a). One of 
the ways that the proponent of a piece of evidence may support a contention that the evidence is 
what the proponent claims is to offer "[t]estimony of a witness with knowledge that a matter is 
what it is claimed to be." I.R.E. 90 l (b )(1 ). In this case, the State utterly failed to establish that 
Exhibit 46 was the boot lace actually used to tie Mrs. Joy up on the night of July 28-29, 2009. 
First, Mrs. Joy's testimony was that the boot lace with which she was allegedly tied up 
was made out of leather, not nylon.39 Thus, the nylon lace that was offered into evidence as 
Exhibit 46 clearly was not the lace allegedly used to bind her. 
Second, when Mrs. Joy was specifically asked to identify Exhibit 46 as the boot lace with 
which she had been bound, she was unable to do so. Initially, she indicated that she was "pretty 
sure" that the lace supposedly used by Mr. Joy "was exactly like" Exhibit 46. (Tr., p.469, Ls.9-
11.) Next, she said that she was "pretty sure" that the lace marked as Exhibit 46 was "the one he 
used." (Tr., p.469, Ls.11-12.) Finally, she testified that she "not exactly sure if' Exhibit 46 was 
the same boot lace that Mr. Joy supposedly used, but she knew "that's the exact same kind he 
Accordingly, concurrently herewith, Mr. Joy is filing a motion requesting that that exhibit be 
transported to this Court. Mr. Joy assumes that that motion will be granted, and inspection of that 
exhibit will bear out the accuracy of Detective March's testimony in this regard. 
39 In furtherance of this contention, Mr. Joy submits that his wife's claim that she does not know 
what leather is (see note 37, supra) is so ridiculous as to warrant no consideration. 
50 
used." (Tr., p.469, Ls.16-18.) Thus, at best, Mrs. Joy indicated that Exhibit 46 could have been 
the boot lace that was allegedly used to bind her. 
Third, circumstances of the seizure of the boot lace that was admitted as Exhibit 46 tend 
to dispel any belief that it was the lace allegedly used by Mr. Joy on the night in question. As 
noted, the police looked in the master bedroom (the place where Mrs. Joy was supposedly 
bound) and Mr. Joy's truck (the place where Mrs. Joy was supposedly untied (see Tr., p.291, 
L.22 p.292, L.4)) and found no boot lace. Indeed, It was not until later that Mrs. Joy's sister-in-
law, who had indisputably not been present for any of the alJeged violence between Mr. and Mrs. 
Joy and, thus, would not have recognized the lace allegedly used and certainly would have seen 
Mr. Joy place any such lace in the bedside table where the lace marked as Exhibit 46 was found. 
Furthermore, it is hardly unusual, and certainly not incriminating, for people to have spare boot 
and shoe laces lying around. 
In light of the foregoing, Mr. Joy submits that the State failed to establish that Exhibit 46 
is what the State claims that it is. And because that is a "condition precedent" to its admission 
under 901 (a), the district court erred in overruling Mr. Joy's "foundation" objection and 
admitting Exhibit 46. 
E. The District Court Erred In Allowing The Prosecutor To Elicit Irrelevant, Highly 
Prejudicial Testimony, Which Was Outsid~ The __ _Scope Of Direct Examination, While 
Questioning Mr. Joy 
While testifying on direct examination, Mr. Joy revealed that during the July 28-29, 2009 
incident, he told his wife that he was going to leave her because he had "had enough." (Tr., 
p.521, Ls.11-14.) In explaining what he meant when he said he had "had enough," Mr. Joy 
testified that he had had to leave their home no less than five times in the last month, his wife 
had failed to live up to her promise to stop being physical with him, and Mr. Joy had failed to 
follow through with her scheduled alcohol treatment. (Tr., p.521, Ls.12-25.) He then went on and 
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explained further that, following the July 3-4, 2009 incident, the Joys had set up alcohol 
treatment for Mrs. Joy in Spokane, Washington, but Mrs. Joy had made up excuse after excuse 
for not attending treatment. (Tr., p.522, Ls.1-15.) The State did not object to any of this 
testimony. (See Tr., p.521, L.11 - p.522, L.21.) 
In cross-examining Mr. Joy, the prosecutor returned to this topic, whereupon the 
following colloquy took place: 
Q .... I think you testified that you were upset that your wife hadn't gone 
to treatment like she was supposed to? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And hadn't been going to any classes like she was supposed to? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Well, isn't it true that it was you that was supposed to be doing that and 
not-
MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I'm going to object. 
MR. VERHAREN: -not her? 
MS. TAYLOR: Objection, outside the scope. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
THE WITNESS: Do I answer? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. VERHAREN: You do. 
THE WITNESS: Can you repeat the question? 
Q. (By Mr. Verharen) Isn't it true that you were supposed to be going to 
classes and not her? 
A. Both of us. 
Q. So is that a yes? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And you hadn't been going either, had you? 
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A.No. 
Q. Even though you were supposed to? 
A. I wasn't supposed to. 
Q. You weren't supposed to? 
A. No. I had none scheduled. 
Q. On July 28th you weren't supposed to be in treatment? 
A.No. 
Q. At some point in time didn't you get in some kind of trouble for not 
being in treatment, around that time period?40 
A No. 
MS. TAYLOR: Objection, outside the scope. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
Q. (By Mr. Verharen) The answer was no? 
A. Correct. 
(Tr., p.578, L.19 - p.5 80, L.8.) 
Mr. Joy contends that that it was error for the district court to have overruled his two 
"beyond the scope" objections. The Idaho Rules of Evidence provide that"[ c.Jross-examination 
should be limited to the subject matter of direct examination and matters affecting the credibility 
of the witness," except that, "[t.Jhe court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into 
additional matters as if on direct examination." I.RE. 611 (b ). In this case, any inquiry into 
40 As noted above, Mr. Joy pied guilty to a misdemeanor based on events occurring during the 
incident of April 10, 2009. (See Tr., p.582, L.17 - p.589, L.20.) Because Mr. Joy was on 
probation for that offense when the present case arose (PSI, p.6), the prosecutor's questions 
about whether Mr. Joy was "supposed to be" in treatment and "get[ ting] in some kind of trouble 
for not being in treatment" appeared to have been thinly veiled references to an alleged condition 
of Mr. Joy's misdemeanor probation and some sort of sanction supposedly imposed for his 
alleged violation of that condition. 
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whether Mr. Joy was required to attend treatment was wholly irrelevant to the matters discussed 
during his direct examination-namely, why Mr. Joy was upset with his wife and had threatened 
to leave her. Accordingly, the prosecutor's questions went beyond the scope of direct 
examination for purposes of Rule 611 (b ). 
Furthermore, insofar as the district court's decision to overrule defense counsel's 
objections could be construed as an implied decision to permit inquiry under Rule 61 l(b), it is 
clear that the district court abused its discretion. Not only was the prosecutor's line of inquiry 
irrelevant to anything that was discussed on direct examination, but it was irrelevant generally. 
See I.R.E. 401 (defining "relevant evidence" as "evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or 
less probable"); LR.E. 402 ("Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible"). Moreover, the 
prosecutor's questions concerning treatment informed the jury of Mr. Joy's alcohol problem and 
tipped off the astute jurors to the fact that Mr. Joy was on probation or otherwise had done 
something to warrant his being required to attend treatment, which was extremely prejudicial 
and, further, was not included in the State's notice of its intent to offer "prior bad act" evidence 
(see :--.iotice of Intent to Produce I.R.E. 404(b) Evidence; R., pp.67-80, 81 ). See I.RE. 403 
(allowing for the exclusion of even relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice); l.R.E. 404(b) (prohibiting the admission of "prior 
bad act" evidence to prove the defendant's propensity to commit crime, and requiring the 
proponent of "prior bad act" evidence offered for another purpose to provide notice of its intent 
to offer such evidence for such other purpose). Clearly, the intent behind the prosecutor's line of 
inquiry was simply to retaliate for the admission of testimony prejudicial to the State by offering 
testimony that was prejudicial to the defense; however, this is not a valid purpose for permitting 
cross-examination that goes well beyond the scope of direct examination. 
54 
F. The District Court Erred In Allowing The Prosecutor To Question Mr. Joy Concerning 
Another Witness's Beliefs 
In his defense, Mr. Joy offered the testimony of his son, Jonathan, to rebut the State's 
evidence concerning one of the alleged "prior bad acts." (See Tr., p.484, L.2 - p.501, L.4.) On 
direct examination, Jonathon testified that, with regard to the incident of July 19, 2009, Mrs. Joy 
was drinking, and was actually the aggressor, slapping and pushing her husband. (Tr., p.488, L.3 
- p.491, L.13.) Later, during his cross-examination, the prosecutor attempted to raise the 
inference that Jonathan had lied by questioning why, if Jonathan saw Mrs. Joy striking Mr. Joy, 
he never called the police to report that Mrs. Joy had committed a crime against his father. (Tr., 
p.499, L.3 - p.500, L.9.) At that time, the following exchange occurred: 
Q. Did you tell the police what happened, that crime that you say you 
saw? 
A. No. And my dad wouldn't either. Girls hit guys. It's-I mean, girls do 
that so I don't-I don't know what to tell you. 
Q. Girls do that as a matter of course? 
A. What's that? 
Q. Girls do that regularly? 
A. Girls do that because they can. 
Q. What do you mean by girls do that because they can? 
A. I mean that-I mean that, uh, girls can be a lot more violent and not get 
consequences for it. I mean that girls can hit a guy in the face several times and it 
[will] not leave a bruise. I mean that-I don't know what you want me to say. 
(Tr., p.500, Ls.8-23.) At no point did the prosecutor object to the fact that Jonathan's testimony 
was non-responsive or exceeded the scope of the questions asked; rather, the prosecutor simply 
terminated his cross-examination of Jonathan after the above-quoted exchange. (See Tr., p.500, 
Ls.8-25.) 
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Later, while cross-examining Mr. Joy, the prosecutor attempted to revisit the topic of 
Jonathan Joy's testimony. At that time, the following exchange occurred: 
Q. Did you ever talk to your son about how women are the instigators of a 
lot of fights between men and women? 
A.No. 
Q. Did you ever talk to your son about how a lot of times when a woman 
hit a man it just doesn't show up on their face or their body, the marks? 
A.No. 
Q. Are those beliefs your son has come by himself independent of you? 
MS. TAYLOR [Defense Counsel]: Objection, Your Honor. Speculation. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
THE WITNESS: Can you repeat the question? 
Q. (By Mr. Verharen) How'd your son come up with beliefs like that? 
MS. TAYLOR: Objection, speculation. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
THE WITNESS: How? 
MR. VERHAREN: How? 
THE WITNESS: Um, we grew up farm boys. We fall down, we get 
bumps, we get bruises, we handle hunting dogs, we run through the woods, we get 
scraped by brush, we get hit, the dogs are on us, they scrape us, they scratch us, 
we play hard, we ride motorcycles, we ride ATVs, we ride horses. We've got 
bumps and bruises and been hit that we knew was gonna leave a mark and never 
did. 
Q. (By Mr. Verharen) Well, that's not what we're talking about. 
A Well, you asked-
Q. We're talking about your son's belief that women are the instigators 
quite often of these fights between men and women. Remember that? 
MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, objection. 
THE WITNESS: No. 
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MS. TAYLOR: Asked and answered. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
Q. (By Mr. Verharen) What don't you remember? 
A I don't remember him saying he believed that women were the 
instigators. 
Q. And you've never given your son any cause to believe something like 
that? 
A I have not. 
Q. What about the fact that a lot of times when a man gets hit by a woman 
it doesn't show up on their face? Did you ever give your son any cause to believe 
that? 
MS. TAYLOR: Objection. Asked and answered. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
THE WITNESS: Yes, I have. 
Q. Can you tell us how that happened? 
A. He's seen me hit on the face and he's seen that no bruises appear later. 
(Tr., p.597, L.15 ~ p.599, L.18.) 
Mr. Joy contends that it was error for the district court to have oven-uled his two 
"speculation" objections and, thereby, forced him to testify as to a matter that he clearly had no 
personal knowledge of-why another witness (Jonathan Joy) holds the beliefs that he does. 41 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 602 provides that "[a] witness may not testify to a matter unless 
evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of 
the matter." In this case, there was no evidence to support a finding that Mr. Joy could have 
41 Although Mr. Joy challenges only the district court's rulings on his "speculation" objections in 
this appeal, it is notable that the prosecutor was also argumentative with Mr. Joy (see Tr., p.598, 
Ls.10-23 (responding to Mr. Joy's answer with "[w]ell, that's not what we're talking about," and 
then cutting Mr. Joy off when he attempted to respond), and misstated Jonathan's testimony in 
cross-examining Mr. Joy (see Tr., p.598, Ls.21-23 ("We're talking about your son's belief that 
women arc the instigators quite often of these fights between men and women.")). 
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known why his son held the beliefs he expressed while testifying. First, any attempt for one 
witness to testify as to the thought processes of another is highly suspect. Second, Mr. Joy had 
already been specifically asked by the prosecutor whether he had "ever talk[ed] to [his] son 
about how a lot of times when a woman hits a man it just doesn't show up on their face or their 
body, the marks," and Mr. Joy denied having done so. (Tr., p.597, Ls.19-22.) Thus, it should 
have been apparent that, in order to testify as to why Jonathan held these beliefs, Mr. Joy would 
be required to rely on speculation, not personal knowledge. Accordingly, the prosecutor should 
have never been allowed to ask Mr. Joy why his son held the beliefs that he did, and the district 
court erred in twice ruling that the prosecutor was allowed to ask (and Mr. Joy was required to 
answer) those questions. 
G. The District Court Erred In Allowing TheJ:'rose1::lltor To Badger Mr. Jov While Cross-
Examining Him 
As noted throughout this Appellant's Brief, it was Mr. Joy's testimony that, during the 
night of July 28-29, 2009, his wife was drunk and jealous, and that she was the instigator and 
perpetrator of the physical violence. (See Tr., p.517, L.12 p.529, L.15, p.543, L.1 p.556, 
L.15.) As noted, he testified that, at one point, he was able to get away from his wife and go 
outside, whereupon Mrs. Joy stormed after him, stumbled off the back deck and onto the lawn, 
got up and threw her glass at him, then charged at him, missing him and flying over a short 
(three-foot) fence and down an embankment into some brush. (Tr., p.527, L.12 p.529, L.6, 
p.543, L.3 p.545, L.17.) Mr. Joy testified that his wife struggled to climb back up the brush-
covered embankment, and even fell back down once. (Tr., p.545, L.18 p.546, L.12.) 
On cross-examination, the State questioned Mr. Joy about his wife's appearance after the 
more turbulent events of that evening, and Mr. Joy testified she looked "[l]ike hell. She was beat 
up. She was filthy dirty, had sticks and leaves in her hair. She looked like hell. Her lip was all 
bloody and her face was all swelled up. She looked bad." (Tr., p.635, Ls.19-23.) Shortly 
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thereafter, the prosecutor proceeded to badger Mr. Joy concerning the sticks he had testified were 
in his wife's hair: 
Q. And about how many sticks were in her hair? 
A. Oh, I don't know. 
Q. Take a wild stab at it. 
A. There were little pieces of brush in her hair. 
MS. TAYLOR [Defense Counsel]: Objection, speculation. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
Q. (By Mr. Verharen) How many little pieces of brush were in her hair? 
A. I did not count them. 
Q. A lot? 
A Quite a bit. 
MS. TAYLOR: Objection, asked and answered. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
Q. (By Mr. Verharen) Over twenty? 
A I don't know. 
MS. TAYLOR: Objection, speculation. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
Q. (By Mr. Verharen) Over twelve. 
MS. TAYLOR: Objection, speculation. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
THE WITNESS: I don't know. 
(Tr., p.637, Ls.5-25.) 
Mr. Joy contends that the district court erred in overruling all of these objections to the 
prosecutor's questions. The fact is that once the prosecutor asked how many sticks were in Mrs. 
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Joy's hair and Mr. Joy responded by saying he did not know, the inquiry should have ceased. By 
allowing the prosecutor to continue asking this question, the district court allowed the prosecutor 
to ask Mr. Joy to guess at the number of sticks in his wife's hair; in other words, the prosecutor's 
questions called for testimony that was outside Mr. Joy's personal knowledge. This was 
improper and, thus, Mr. Joy's three "speculation" objections should have been sustained. See 
l.R.E. 602 ("A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to 
support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.")) 
Further, by allowing the prosecutor to continue asking a question that Mr. Joy clearly 
could not answer, the district court allowed the prosecutor to waste everyone's time while, at the 
same time harassing Mr. Joy. See I.R.E. 403 (evidence may be excluded "if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice ... or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence"); l.R.E. 61 l(a) ("The 
court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and 
presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the 
ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses 
from harassment or undue enbarassment."); see also Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 694 
(1931) ("There is a duty [of the trial court] to protect [the witness] from questions which go 
beyond the bounds of proper cross-examination merely to harass, annoy or humiliate him."). 
Thus, Mr. Joy's "asked and answered" objection should have been sustained. 
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IV. 
The District Court Erred In Refusing To Instruct The Jury On The Les~_er IJ:1cluded Offenses Of 
Misdemeanor Domestic Batterv And False Imprisonment 
A. Introduction 
Prior to Mr. Joy's trial, he submitted proposed jury instructions on two lesser-included 
offenses: misdemeanor domestic battery and false imprisonment.42 (R., pp.135-40.) At a jury 
instruction conference held mid-trial (after the State rested, but before the defense had completed 
its presentation of its case-in-chief), the district court heard Mr. Joy's arguments on the requested 
instruction on misdemeanor domestic battery (Mr. Joy's counsel argued that the jury could find 
that Mrs. Joy's "traumatic injuries" were all caused by her own actions and/or Mr. Joy's 
reasonable self-defense, but that Mr. Joy's actions, at times, exceeded what was reasonable self-
defense and, thus, constituted domestic battery) but, ultimately, took the matter under 
advisement. (Tr., p.535, L.11 - p.536, L.13.) At a later jury instruction conference, held after the 
close of the evidentiary portion of the trial, the district court heard further arguments on the 
requested instruction on misdemeanor domestic battery. (Tr., p.654, L.13 p.655, L.12.) It also 
heard arguments on the requested instruction on false imprisonment. (Tr., p.655, L.13 - p.656, 
L.7.) Ultimately though, it declined to instruct the jury on either of the lesser-included offenses. 
(Tr., p.656, Ls.8-23.) With regard to misdemeanor domestic battery, the district court reasoned 
that the requested instruction was inappropriate because Mr. Joy's self-defense theory was an all-
or-nothing defense whereby, if the jury found that Mr. Joy did not act in self-defense, there was 
no way it could find that he did not cause a traumatic injury. (Tr., p.656, Ls.14-22.) And, with 
42 Mr. Joy did not actually propose to instruct the jury with the term "misdemeanor" in referring 
to the lesser-included offense of misdemeanor domestic battery; rather, he proposed that the 
district court instruct the jury on "the included offense of Domestic Battery (no traumatic 
injury." (R., p.135.) The term "misdemeanor" domestic battery is simply a shorthand way of 
referring to that lesser-included offense in this Appellant's Brief. 
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regard to false imprisonment, the district court reasoned as follows: "Given the defendant's 
version of what happened vis-a-vis the truck, I don't see how giving a false imprisonment 
instruction is appropriate." (Tr., p.656, Ls.12-14.) 
Mr. Joy submits that the district court's refusal to instruct the jury on the lesser-included 
offenses of misdemeanor domestic battery and false imprisonment was reversible. Below, he 
explains why misdemeanor domestic battery and false imprisonment are, in fact, lesser-included 
offenses of felony domestic battery and second degree kidnapping, respectively; he asserts that 
because the evidence would have supported a finding that he committed the lesser-included 
offenses, but not the greater offenses, it was error for the district court not to have given the 
requested instructions; and he argues that errors such as this are not per se harmless. 
B. Applicable Legal Standards 
"A trial court presiding over a criminal case must instruct the jury on all matters of law 
necessary for the jury's information." State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710 (2009). Idaho law 
provides that the district court "shall" instruct the jury as to a lesser-included offense if two 
requirements are met.43 First, one of the parties must have requested the instruction. J.C. § 19-
213 2(b) (1 ). Second, there must be "a reasonable view of the evidence presented in the case that 
43 
"There are two theories under which a particular offense may be determined to be a lesser 
included offense." State v. Curtis, 130 Idaho 522, 524 (1996) (hereinafter Curtis JI). Under the 
"statutory theory," an offense is a lesser-included offense of the greater offense if it is impossible 
to commit the greater offense without also committing the lesser offense in the process. Id. In 
contrast, under the "pleading theory," an offense is a lesser-included offense "if it is alleged in 
the information as a means or element of the commission of the higher offense." Id. Under this 
second theory, in other words, "a court will look to see if the complaint charges the accused with 
a crime the proof of which necessarily includes the proof of the acts which constitute the lesser-
included offense." State v. Matalamaki, l 39 Idaho 341, 343-44 (Ct.App. 2003). Only one of 
these two theories must be satisfied in order to find that an offense is a lesser-included offense. 
Id. at 343. 
"The determination of whether a particular crime is an included offense of the crime 
charged involves a question of law over which this Court exercises free review." Curtis JI, l 30 
Idaho at 523. 
62 
would support a finding that the defendant committed such lesser included offenses but did not 
commit the greater offense." I.C. § 19-2132(b)(2). 
Idaho's appellate courts "exercise[ ] free review over whether a jury was given proper 
instructions." Severson, 147 Idaho at 710. 
C. The District Court Erred In Refusing To Instruct The Jury On The Lesser Included 
Offense Of Misdemeanor Domestic Battery 
Whether evaluated under the statutory theory or the pleading theory, there can be little 
doubt that misdemeanor domestic battery is a lesser-included offense of the felony domestic 
battery that was charged in this case. Mr. Joy was charged with felony domestic battery under 
I.C. § 18-918(2)(a). (See R., pp.50-51.) The elements of that offense are: (1) commission of a 
battery; (2) by one household member; (3) against another household member; and (4) willful 
infliction of a traumatic injury upon that household member. See I.C. § l 8-918(2)(a). The 
elements of misdemeanor domestic battery are the same, except that traumatic injury need not be 
shown; those elements are as follows: (1) commission of a battery; (2) by one household 
member; (3) against another household member. See I.C. § 18-918(3)(b). 
Likewise, there can be little doubt that Mr. Joy specifically requested a jury instruction on 
the lesser-included offense of misdemeanor domestic battery. (See R., pp.13-37; Tr., p.535, L.11 
- p.536, L.13, p.654, L.13 - p.655, L.12, p.656, Ls.14-23.) 
Thus, the only question is whether there is "a reasonable view of the evidence presented 
in the case that would support a finding that the defendant committed such lesser included 
offenses but did not commit the greater offense" of felony domestic battery. I.C. § I 9-2132(b) 
(2). Mr. Joy contends that, the district court's ruling (see Tr., p.656, Ls.14-23) notwithstanding, 
there is such a reasonable view of the evidence. 
As noted, Mr. Joy testified that on the night of July 28-29, 2009, he had an argument with 
his wife that turned physical; however, it was Mr. Joy's testimony that he acted in self-defense 
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throughout the fight. In so doing, Mr. Joy identified numerous discreet instances where Mrs. Joy 
could have been bruised or suffered some other "traumatic injury." Specifically, he described at 
least two instances in which he used his arms to block his wife's blows (see Tr., p.518, L.15 -
p. 519, L.6, p.525, Ls.15-1 7); he described at least one instance in which he grabbed a hold of his 
wife's arms as she charged at him (see Tr., p.621, L.4 - p.622, L.1 O); he explained that he kicked 
at his wife after she knocked him to the floor and proceeded to stomp on him (p.524, L.15 -
p.525, L.13); he testified that he shoved her onto her backside as she charged him once more 
(Tr., p.525, L.11 - p.526, L.2); and he described observing her fall off the porch and, moments 
later, careen down a brushy embankment in her efforts to get to him (see Tr., p.527, L.16 -
p.528, L.15, p.545, L.2 - p.546, L.12). In light of this testimony, the jury very easily could have 
concluded that one or more of Mr. Joy's actions exceeded what would have been reasonable self-
defense and, thus, rose to the level of a battery, but that the State failed to prove any nexus 
between that battery and Mrs. Joy's injuries. In other words, the jury could have found that Mrs. 
Joy's traumatic injuries were all the result of Mr. Joy's proper defensive actions and/or Mrs. 
Joy's self-caused falls. In this vein, although the district court found it very significant that Mr. 
Joy admitted that he likely caused his wife's black eye (see Tr., p.656, Ls.16-19), the reality is 
that the jury very easily could have found that the black eye, which Mr. Joy testified probably 
came about when he was fighting to get off of the closet floor as his wife stomped on him (see 
Tr., p.558, Ls.14-22, p.639, Ls.1-11) was the result of his self-defense. 
In light of all of this, Mr. Joy submits that it was error for the district court to have failed 
to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of misdemeanor domestic battery. 
D. The District Court Erred In Refusing To Instruct The Jury On The Lesser Included 
Offense Of False Imprisonment 
Just as there can be little doubt that misdemeanor domestic battery is a lesser-included 
offense of felony domestic battery, so too can there be little doubt that false imprisonment is a 
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lesser-included offense of kidnapping. The Idaho Supreme Court has held as much. State v. 
Wilcott, 103 Idaho 766, 767 (1982). And this makes sense, of course, because a kidnapping could 
not be accomplished without falsely imprisoning the victim in the process. The elements of the 
greater offense of kidnapping (as charged in this case (see R., pp.50-51)) are: (1) seizure or 
confinement of Jennifer Joy; (2) by Preston Joy; (3) with the intent to keep or detain Mrs. Joy 
against her will; (4) without authority of law. I.C. § 18-4501(1). As such, they necessarily 
include the elements of false imprisonment-(1) violation of Jennifer Joy's personal liberty, i.e., 
her right to come and go or stay when and where she pleases; (2) by Preston Joy; (3) without 
authority of law. I.C. § 18-2901; see also I.C.J.I. 1233. In other words, the elements of the two 
offenses are virtually identical except that the lesser offense of false imprisonment does not 
include any requirement that the defendant with the intent to restrain the victim against her will. 
Likewise, there can be little doubt that Mr. Joy specifically requested a jury instruction on 
the lesser-included offense of false imprisonment. (R., pp.13 8-40; Tr., p.655, L.13 - p.656, 
L.14.) 
Thus, again, the only question is whether there is "a reasonable view of the evidence 
presented in the case that would support a finding that the defendant committed such lesser 
included offenses but did not commit the greater offense" of second degree kidnapping. LC. § 
19-2132(b) (2). Mr. Joy contends that, the district court's ruling (see Tr., p.656, Ls.12-14) 
notwithstanding, there is such a reasonable view of the evidence. 
Under the evidence in this case, there were two alleged events that the jury could have 
found constituted kidnapping or false imprisonment: first, Mr. Joy's alleged binding of Mrs. Joy 
with a boot lace in the bathtub; second, Mr. Joy's alleged detention of Mrs. Joy in his pickup 
truck. With regard to either alleged event, given the evidence in this case, the jury could have 
found either kidnapping or false imprisonment. 
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With regard to the alleged boot lace incident, as noted above, Mrs. Joy testified that she 
was physically abused, stripped naked, hogtied, and then anally penetrated against her will. In 
contrast, as is also noted, Mr. Joy testified very differently, denying that there was any bondage 
or sodomy on the night question. However, this does not mean that the jury had to accept either 
individual's account in toto; the jury could have found that the truth lay somewhere in between. 
Indeed, the jury also heard evidence that Mr. and Mrs. Joy have engaged in sexual bondage (Tr., 
p.558, L.23 - p.561, L.16) and that, although Mrs. Joy now says she never cared for it, she 
allowed her husband to penetrate her anally during sex (see Tr., p.381, L.24- p.382, L.10). Thus, 
the jury in this case could have easily found that Mrs. Joy did not really want to be tied up by her 
husband on the night of July 28-29, 2009, but that she wanted to appease him so she failed to 
protest, in which case Mr. Joy, believing that his wife was a willing participant, would have 
restrained her liberty against her will, but he would have done so without the intent to keep or 
detain her against her will. Accordingly, the jury could have found that Mr. Joy could have 
committed the lesser included offense of false imprisonment in binding his wife, but that he did 
not commit the greater offense of second degree kidnapping in doing so. 
With regard to the alleged pickup truck incident, as noted, Mrs. Joy testified that she was 
dragged to the truck in a hogtied position, physically abused while in the truck, driven around the 
Joys' property, and threatened with being tied to a tree and left to die in the woods. Again, Mr. 
Joy told a very different story; he testified that after he packed his things, he went to leave in his 
pickup, but that Mrs. Joy climbed in the cab of the truck and attempted to persuade him to stay. 
Again, the jury need not have accept either individual's account in toto, as it could have found 
that the truth lay somewhere in between the two stories. Indeed, the jury also heard evidence that 
Mrs. Joy's original statement to the police was that she got her husband "calmed down and 
acting nice towards her," and that, because Mr. Joy wanted to go for a drive, "the two of them 
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went outside to go for a drive." (Tr., p.441, Ls.11-22.) Thus, the jury could have very easily 
believed that what really happened was that Mr. Joy was not being overtly physical or 
threatening, but that Mrs. Joy took a drive with him (even though she did not want to) in order to 
appease him and avoid an angry outburst. In this event, the jury could have concluded that Mr. 
Joy effectively restrained his wife's personal liberty, but he did it without the intent to keep or 
detain her against her will. Thus, once again, the jury could have found that Mr. Joy committed 
the lesser included offense of false imprisonment (this time, in taking his wife for a drive), but 
that he did not commit the greater offense of second degree kidnapping in the process. 
E. The District Court's Error In Failing To Instruct The Jurv On The Lesser-Incll1<fed 
Offenses Of Misdemeanor Domestic Battery And False Imprisonment Was Not ljarmless 
Idaho Criminal Rule 52 provides that "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which 
does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." This Rule has been interpreted to require 
that judgments be affirmed, even in the face of error by the district court, if the error is 
"harmless." See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221 n.3 (2010). In Perry, the Idaho Supreme 
Court made it clear that all errors--whether constitutional or otherwise-are evaluated for 
"harmlessness" under the standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). In Chapman, the Supreme Court held that in determining 
whether an error is harmless, the reviewing court determines whether it appears, beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the jury's verdict. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. 
"To say that an error did not contribute to the verdict is ... to find that error unimportant in 
relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record." 
Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 403 (1991). The issue is whether the jury actually rested its verdict 
on evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, independently of the inadmissible evidence. Id. at 404-
05. "The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty 
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verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this 
trial was surely unattributable to the error." Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993). 
In 1996, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that any failure of a district court to instruct a 
jury on a lesser-included offense, as requested by the defendant, is necessarily harmless error. 
State v. Curtis, 130 Idaho 525, 527-28 (Ct.App. 1996) (hereinafter, Curtis I); see also State v. 
Hudson, 129 Idaho 4 7 8, 48 0-81 (Ct.App. 1996) (decided the same day as Curtis I, and reaching 
the same holding).44 However, when Curtis I went up to the Idaho Supreme Court on review, the 
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision on an alternative basis and, therefore, never 
addressed the harmless error question. Curtis JI, 130 Idaho at 524-25. In fact, although the Idaho 
Supreme Court has now had multiple opportunities to affirm or repudiate the Court of Appeals' 
holdings in Curtis I and Hudson, it has never reached the issue of whether the failure to instruct 
the jury on a lesser-included offense is necessarily a harmless error. See, e.g., State v. Young, 138 
Idaho 370 (2003) (failing to reach a harmlessness analysis because of holding that requested jury 
instruction on lesser-included offense was, in fact, not warranted); State v. Rosencrantz, 130 
Idaho 666 (1997) (same); Curtis II, 130 Idaho 522 (same); see also State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 
288, 293-94 (Ct.App. 1997), rev. denied (May 29, 1998). 
The Court of Appeals' rationale behind Curtis I, Hudson, and their progeny, is as 
follows: (a) LC.§ 19-2132(c) requires that if a lesser-included offense instruction is given to a 
jury, the court must also give an instruction stating that the jury may not consider the lesser 
offense unless it has first found the defendant not guilty of the greater offenses (this has become 
known as the "acquittal first" provision); (b) "juries will invariably adhere to the instructions on 
44 The continuing viability of Curtis I seems somewhat questionable, given that the Idaho 
Supreme Court granted review in that case and wound up affirming the district court's ruling on 
alternate basis. See generally Curtis II, supra, 130 Idaho 522. However, any question regarding 
the continuing viability of Curtis I is somewhat academic, given that Hudson is still good law. 
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the greater offense and will acquit if they entertain a reasonable doubt as to the presence of any 
element of that offense, even if doing so means freeing a defendant who is plainly guilty of some 
serious crime," Curtis I, 130 Idaho at 529; thus, (c) so long as the defendant has been convicted 
of the greater offense, the failure to instruct the jury on a lesser-included offense, even if error, is 
necessarily harmless because, even if the jury had been instructed on the lesser-included offense, 
it could not have reached that instruction because of the "acquittal first" instruction, id. at 527-
28. 
This reasoning, however, does not compel a harmless error finding in this case though. 
Preliminarily, as noted above, because the Idaho Supreme Court has never endorsed the 
reasoning of Curtis I, Hudson, or any of their progeny, those cases cannot be said to definitively 
state the law of the land in Idaho. See State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 984-87 (1992) ("To this 
Court falls the obligation to be and remain the ultimate authority in fashioning, declaring, 
amending, and discarding rules, principles, and doctrines of precedential law by application of 
which the lower courts will fashion their decisions. This Court has been and remains the final 
arbiter ofldaho rules oflaw, both those promulgated and those evolving decisionally."). 
Furthermore, the reasoning of Curtis I, Hudson, and their progeny is unsound. First, it is 
patently illogical to assume, as at least some of these case have, that had the district court 
properly instructed the jury regarding the lesser-included offense, then it also would have given 
the "acquittal first" instruction required by J.C.§ 19-2132(c). In a case such as this one-where 
the district court has already demonstrated its inability to correctly instruct the jury-denying the 
defendant relief from the district court's error based on an assumption that the district would 
have otherwise instructed the jury correctly is quite irrational. The fact is that if the district court 
erred in failing to adhere to the requirements of LC.§ 19-2132(b), the appellate courts can have 
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no faith that the district court would have necessarily adhered to the requirements of LC. § 19-
2132(c). 
Second, to read the "acquittal first" instruction requirement of I. C. § 19-2132( c) as 
rendering harmless any error in failing to instruct the jury of appropriate lesser-included 
offenses, as is explicitly required by I. C. § l 9-2 l 32(b ), is to create a bright line rule that states 
that no defendant may ever enforce the mandate of section l 9-2 l 32(b ). This would "leave[ ] 
Idaho jurisprudence embracing the anomaly that, while a defendant is unquestionably entitled to 
have the jury instructed on lesser included offenses that are supported by the evidence ... there 
will never be a remedy for a denial of that right."45 Curtis I, 130 Idaho at 53 0 (Lansing, J ., 
dissenting). Judge Schwartzman later expanded upon this observation in State v. Young, 2001 
WL 468534 (Ct.App. May 4, 2001) (opinion withdrawn), wherein he wrote as follows: 
In effect, Curtis I does completely away with the doctrine and law of 
included offenses, rendering it wholly nugatory. Failure to give an included 
offense instruction, even if the evidence clearly calls for it and the offense is 
necessarily included in the greater offense, would be beyond the pale of judicial 
review as long as the jury came back with a guilty verdict on the greater offense. 
Young, 2001 WL 468534 at *7 (Schwartzman, J., concurring). Judge Schwartzman took the view 
that "[s]uch a holding would ... violate a defendant's fundamental right to due process," and he 
"urge[d] the Idaho Supreme Court to review this issue." Id. (emphasis in original).46 
Third, while we generally presume that jurors follow the instructions that they are given, 
there are instances in which pragmatic realities tend to overcome this presumption. Specifically, 
45 This would indeed be an anomaly, for as Justice Marshall wrote more than two hundred years 
ago, "[t]he government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, 
and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no 
remedy for the violation ofa vested legal right." }vfarbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803). 
46 The Supreme Court did grant review in Young; however, as noted above, because it held that 
an instruction on the lesser-included offense in question was not called for, it did not reach the 
question of whether the theoretical possibility of an "acquittal first" instruction necessarily 
renders harmless all errors in failing to instruct jurors on lesser-included offenses. See State v. 
Young, 138 Idaho 370 (2003). 
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if the presumption contravenes common sense or creates an undue risk of an erroneous 
conviction, it should not apply. Thus, Judge Lansing, who dissented in both Curtis I and 
Hudson,47 rejected the notion that jurors will always follow an admonition, given pursuant to I.C. 
§ 19-2132( c ), not to consider a lesser-included offense until first concluding that the defendant is 
not guilty of the greater offense. See Curtis I, 130 Idaho at 529 (Lansing, J., dissenting). She 
pointed out that lesser-included offense instructions are critically important in reducing the 
likelihood of wrongful convictions because they present jurors-who would otherwise be 
confronted with the choice of convicting a defendant who is clearly guilty of committing some 
crime (but not the crime charged), or exonerating him completely, and who may, therefore, 
convict the defendant of the crime charged, even though it was not proven, merely to ensure that 
a guilty person does not go free-with the third choice of convicting the defendant of the crime 
actually committed. Curtis I, 130 Idaho at 528, 530 (Lansing, J., dissenting). 
Judge Lansing's dissent in Curtis I finds support in no less an authority than the United 
States Supreme Court. In Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205 (1973), the issue was whether a 
federal law, the Major Crimes Act of 1885, afforded a criminal defendant a right to an instruction 
on a lesser-included offense. The Supreme Court answered that question affirmatively and, in the 
process, explicitly rejected the rationale employed by the Idaho Court of Appeals in Curtis I: 
True, if the prosecution has not established beyond a reasonable doubt every 
element of the offense charged, and if no lesser offense instruction is offered, the 
jury must, as a theoretical matter, return a verdict of acquittal. But a defendant is 
entitled to a lesser offense instruction-in this context or any other-precisely 
because he should not be exposed to the substantial risk that the jury's practice 
i,yill diverge from theory. Where one of the elements of the offense charged 
remains in doubt, but the defendant is plainly guilty of some offense, the jury is 
likely to resolve its doubts in favor of convictioI).. 
47 Judge Lansing has stood by her dissents in Curtis I. See State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288, 297 
(Ct.App. 1998) (Lansing, J., concurring); State v. Rosencrantz, Idaho_, 927 P.2d 921 (Ct.App. 
1996) (Lansing, J., dissenting) (opinion withdrawn). 
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Keeble, 412 U.S. at 212-213 (emphasis added). The Court then went on in dictum to state that 
although it had not yet "explicitly held that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
guarantees the right of a defendant to have the jury instructed on a lesser included defense," and 
although it need not reach the due process issue because it could decide the case based on its 
interpretation of a federal statute, "it is nevertheless clear that a construction of the major crimes 
Act to preclude such an instruction would raise difficult constitutional questions." 
Subsequently, in Beck v. Alabama, 477 U.S. 625 (1980), the Supreme Court reiterated 
two of the important concerns from Keeble-first, the defendant's interest in obtaining a jury 
instruction as to lesser-included offenses is of critical importance, and second, when it comes to 
the choice of convicting or acquitting a defendant, jurors will rightly look at the "big picture" 
and try to do justice. As to the first point, the Court held that an instruction on a lesser-included 
offense is critical to the defendant because it "affords the jury a less drastic alternative than the 
choice between conviction of the offense charged and acquittal ... and ensures that the jury will 
accord the defendant the full benefit of the reasonable-doubt standard." Id. at 633-34. To do 
otherwise, the Court held, "would seem inevitably to enhance the risk of an unwarranted 
conviction." Id. at 637. 
As to the second point, the Beck Court also attacked the presumption underpinning Curtis 
I-that jurors follow the trial judge's instructions when those instructions lead to what they 
consider to be absurd results: 
I suggest that, although there is no historical data to support it, most, if not all, 
jurors at this point in our history perhaps equally abhor setting free a defendant 
where the evidence established his guilt of a serious crime .... Jurors are not 
expected to come into the jury box and leave behind all that their human 
experience has taught them .... To expect a jury to find a defendant innocent and 
thereby set him free when the evidence establishes beyond doubt that he is guilty 
of some violent crime requires of our juries clinical detachment from the reality of 
human experience. 
Id. at 642 (quoting Jacobs v. State, 361 So.2d 640, 651-52 (Ala. 1978) (Shores, J., dissenting)). 
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Having reaffirmed these core principles from Keeble, the Supreme Court stated that, 
"[w]hile we have never held that a defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense instruction as 
a matter of due process, the nearly universal acceptance of the rule in both state and federal 
courts establishes the value to the defendant of this procedural safeguard." Id. at 637. It then held 
that in capital murder cases, failure to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses violated the 
defendant's due process rights.48 Id. at 638. Thus, although the United States Supreme Court has 
not yet specifically held that a defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense instruction as a 
matter of due process in non-capital cases, Keeble and Beck demonstrate that it is clearly moving 
in that direction. More importantly for purposes of this case though, the Supreme Court has made 
it abundantly clear that it is critical for juries to be instructed on the appropriate lesser-included 
offenses and, thus, made aware of all of their options.49 In light of the importance of such 
instructions to the jury's decision-making function, it seems somewhat naive to rely on the 
presumption that an "acquittal first" instruction would not only be given, but would actually be 
followed by the jury, in declaring that it is always harmless error to fail to instruct a jury on 
appropriate lesser-included offenses. 
In the present case, therefore, the district court's error in failing to give the jury the 
required lesser-included offense instructions was reversible error. 
48 Again, however, the Court declined to expand its holding beyond the confines of the case at 
hand and, therefore, declined to address the issue of "whether the Due Process Clause would 
require the giving of such instructions in anoncapital case." Beck, 447 U.S. at 638 n.14. 
49 The Idaho Supreme Court has also recognized the importance of instructing the jury on all 
appropriate lesser-included offenses: 
[A] justification for the lesser included offense doctrine is fundamental fairness 
both to the defendant and to the prosecution. It is said to prevent the conviction of 
a defendant of a greater crime when he might be guilty only of a lesser offense, 
and on the other hand to prevent a total acquittal of a larger crime when a 
defendant may have committed all of the elements of a lesser crime. 
State v. Padilla, 101 Idaho 713, 716 (1980) (citation omitted). 
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v. 
The Accumulation of Errors In This Case Deprived Mr. Joy Of A Fair Trial 
"Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in and of themselves, 
may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 230 (2010). 
Thus, although Mr. Joy contends that each of the errors cited of above were prejudicial in their 
own right, to the extent that this Court disagrees and finds any of those errors to be harmless, Mr. 
Joy asserts that he is entitled to a new trial nonetheless. He submits that the above errors, when 
aggregated, show the absence of a fair trial in contravention of his constitutional rights. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Joy respectfully requests that this Court vacate his 
convictions and sentences, and that it remand his case for a new trial on the charges for which 
has not yet been acquitted. 
DATED this 18th day of January, 2012. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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